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The	  Court:	  Mr.	  Ginsberg,	  do	  you	  consider	  that	  this	  book	  is	  obscene?	  
Allen	  Ginsberg:	  Not	  really,	  no,	  sir.	  
The	  Court:	  Well,	  would	  you	  be	  surprised	  if	  the	  author	  himself	  admitted	  it	  was	  obscene	  and	  
must	  be	  necessarily	  obscene	  in	  order	  to	  convey	  his	  thoughts	  and	  impressions?	  Well,	  it’s	  on	  
page	  xii	  of	  the	  Introduction:	  “Since	  Naked	  Lunch	  treats	  this	  health	  problem	  [addiction],	  it	  is	  
necessarily	  brutal,	  obscene	  and	  disgusting.	  Sickness	  is	  often	  repulsive	  details	  not	  for	  weak	  
stomachs.”	  
Allen	  Ginsberg:	  Yes,	  he	  has	  said	  that.	  I	  don’t	  think	  he	  intends	  that	  to	  be	  obscene	  in	  any	  
legal	  sense	  or	  even	  obscene	  as	  seen	  through	  his	  own	  eyes	  or	  through	  the	  eyes	  of	  a	  
sympathetic	  reader.	  He	  is	  dealing	  with	  matters	  very	  basic	  and	  very	  frightening.	  
(‘Naked	  Lunch’	  on	  Trial	  xxi).	  
	  
First	  made	  available	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  1962,	  William	  S.	  Burroughs’	  Naked	  
Lunch	  and	  those	  who	  ventured	  to	  sell	  the	  illicit	  book	  were	  brought	  before	  obscenity	  courts	  
on	  three	  separate	  occasions	  within	  the	  book’s	  first	  four	  years	  in	  print.	  Despite	  breaking	  a	  
different	  law	  on	  each	  separate	  occasion,	  Naked	  Lunch	  was	  judged	  to	  be	  equally	  obscene	  in	  
all	  three	  cases.	  However,	  as	  Allen	  Ginsberg’s	  testimony	  during	  the	  1966	  Massachusetts	  
State	  Supreme	  Court	  trial	  that	  eventually	  exonerated	  Naked	  Lunch	  from	  its	  prior	  obscenity	  
convictions	  demonstrates,	  there	  exist	  multiple	  interpretations	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  term	  
“obscene”.	  The	  discrepancy	  of	  usage	  between	  Burroughs,	  Ginsberg	  and	  the	  Court	  
demonstrates	  a	  fundamental	  characteristic	  of	  obscenity,	  its	  ambiguity.	  The	  difficulty	  in	  
definitively	  articulating	  the	  obscene	  is	  best	  characterized	  by	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court	  
Justice,	  Potter	  Stewart,	  in	  his	  famous	  quote,	  “I	  shall	  not	  today	  attempt	  to	  further	  define	  the	  
kinds	  of	  material	  I	  understand	  to	  be	  embraced	  within	  that	  shorthand	  description	  
[pornographic]…	  But	  I	  know	  it	  when	  I	  see	  it.1”	  Despite	  the	  transparency	  and	  moral	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Jacobellis	  v.	  Ohio.	  378	  U.S	  184.	  United	  States	  Supreme	  Court.	  (1964).	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certitude	  Justice	  Potter	  assumes	  in	  his	  widely	  quoted	  remark,	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Supreme	  
Court	  to	  standardize	  or	  elucidate	  a	  description	  of	  the	  obscene	  beyond	  the	  subjective	  acts	  of	  
‘knowing’	  and	  ‘seeing’	  represents	  a	  serious	  lapse	  in	  an	  otherwise	  exacting	  mode	  of	  
discourse.	  	  
	   To	  understand	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  lapse	  and	  to	  begin	  to	  gauge	  its	  influence	  on	  
the	  critical	  reception	  of	  Naked	  Lunch,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  approach	  the	  legal	  origins	  of	  
obscenity.	  While	  the	  clarification	  of	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  Obscene	  Publications	  Act	  of	  1857	  
by	  Regina	  v	  Hicklin	  (1868)	  stands	  as	  the	  first	  attempt	  to	  statutorily	  define	  and	  regulate	  
obscenity,	  the	  landmark	  case	  is	  preceded	  only	  by	  the	  common	  law	  Vagrancy	  Act	  of	  1842.	  
Enacted	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Napoleonic	  Wars,	  the	  Vagrancy	  Act	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  
potentially	  revolutionary	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  large	  number	  of	  discharged	  soldiers	  left	  
unemployed	  and	  destitute	  after	  the	  war.	  Making	  it	  a	  crime	  to	  beg	  or	  distribute	  obscene	  
material	  for	  money,	  the	  Vagrancy	  Act	  also	  functioned	  as	  a	  general	  justification	  for	  the	  
persecution	  of	  social	  outliers,	  such	  as	  the	  homeless,	  gay	  communities,	  sex	  workers,	  and	  the	  
mentally	  disabled.	  With	  this	  legal	  foundation	  in	  mind,	  the	  vague	  nature	  of	  Justice	  Stewart’s	  
definition	  of	  obscenity	  takes	  on	  a	  darker	  hue.	  By	  remaining	  ill	  defined,	  accusations	  of	  
obscenity	  function	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  veil,	  obscuring	  the	  reproduction	  of	  power	  through	  the	  
marginalization	  of	  the	  disempowered.	  By	  pushing	  those	  with	  a	  lack	  of	  power	  to	  margins,	  
power	  is	  reciprocally	  consolidated	  and	  defined	  by	  its	  absence.	  Therefore,	  the	  goal	  of	  
censorship	  must	  be	  thought	  of	  not	  as	  the	  suppression	  of	  obscenity,	  but	  as	  the	  fortification	  
and	  delineation	  of	  the	  contours	  of	  power.	  
	   As	  such,	  the	  genealogy	  of	  obscenity,	  when	  traced	  outwards	  from	  its	  point	  of	  legal	  
origin,	  locates	  Naked	  Lunch	  on	  a	  larger	  historical	  trajectory	  that	  maps	  the	  impact	  of	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censorship	  on	  the	  production	  of	  literature.	  Central	  to	  this	  trajectory	  has	  been	  the	  use	  of	  
progressive	  metaphors	  to	  justify	  and	  conceal	  otherwise	  repressive	  policies	  and	  actions.	  
Applying	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  society	  to	  the	  question	  of	  obscenity,	  Michel	  Foucault	  
contextualizes	  literary	  censorship	  within	  a	  broader	  spectrum	  of	  coercive	  state	  violence.	  	  
Arguing;	  
“Historically,	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  bourgeoisie	  became	  in	  the	  course	  of	  
the	  eighteenth	  century	  the	  politically	  dominant	  class	  was	  masked	  by	  the	  
establishment	  of	  an	  explicit,	  coded	  and	  formally	  egalitarian	  juridical	  
framework,	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  parliamentary,	  
representative	  regime.	  But	  the	  development	  and	  generalization	  of	  
disciplinary	  mechanisms	  constituted	  the	  other,	  dark	  side	  of	  these	  processes.	  
The	  general	  juridical	  form	  that	  guaranteed	  a	  system	  of	  rights	  that	  were	  
egalitarian	  in	  principle	  was	  supported	  by	  these	  tiny,	  everyday,	  physical	  
mechanisms,	  by	  all	  those	  systems	  of	  micro-­‐power	  that	  are	  essentially	  non-­‐
egalitarian	  and	  asymmetrical	  that	  we	  call	  the	  disciplines.	  “	  	  
(Discipline	  and	  Punish	  222)	  
Foucault	  supplies	  an	  analogical	  model	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  nature	  of	  
the	  obscenity	  trial	  and	  its	  legal/critical	  marginalization	  of	  Naked	  Lunch.	  It	  is	  of	  no	  little	  
importance	  then,	  that	  Foucault’s	  identification	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  as	  the	  seat	  of	  
discipline	  also	  happens	  to	  coincide	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  censorship	  of	  commercial	  
publishing	  and	  the	  legal	  recognition	  of	  the	  author	  by	  The	  Statute	  of	  Anne	  (1709).2	  Initially	  a	  
mechanism	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  control,	  censorship	  regulation	  was	  first	  enforced	  to	  
protect	  the	  commercial	  dominance	  of	  the	  Stationer’s	  Company	  of	  London.3	  Touted	  as	  
copyright	  protection	  for	  struggling	  authors,	  “In	  The	  Statute	  of	  Anne,	  the	  author	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  Statute	  of	  Anne	  is	  also	  widely	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  first	  instance	  of	  copyright	  law.	  	  
3	  Granted	  a	  monopoly	  over	  the	  English	  booktrade,	  members	  of	  the	  Stationer’s	  Company	  
were	  insulated	  from	  the	  pressures	  of	  foreign	  competition.	  Ostensibly	  justified	  by	  the	  
crown’s	  desire	  to	  promote	  national	  stability	  through	  the	  suppression	  of	  treasonous	  
content,	  the	  Stationer’s	  Company	  regulated	  what	  material	  its	  members	  could	  and	  could	  not	  
print.	  Establishing	  guild	  membership	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  publishing,	  censorship	  relied	  on	  
the	  force	  of	  law	  to	  perpetuate	  existing	  power	  structures	  and	  forcibly	  assimilate	  dissenting	  
voices.	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established	  as	  a	  legally	  empowered	  figure	  in	  the	  marketplace	  well	  before	  professional	  
authorship	  was	  realized	  in	  practice.”	  (Rose	  4).	  Crediting	  the	  classical	  liberal	  notion	  of	  
Locke’s	  possessive	  individualism	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  authorial	  ownership,	  influential	  London	  
booksellers	  erected	  the	  figure	  of	  the	  author	  as	  a	  democratic	  symbol	  behind	  which	  they	  
could	  continue	  to	  exercise	  their	  economic	  dominance	  with	  impunity.	  An	  unlikely	  precedent	  
for	  the	  modern	  obscenity	  trial,	  “The	  literary-­‐property	  struggle	  [initiated	  by	  The	  Statute	  of	  
Anne]	  generated	  a	  body	  of	  texts-­‐	  parliamentary	  records,	  pamphlets,	  and	  legal	  reports-­‐	  in	  
which	  aesthetic	  and	  legal	  questions	  are	  often	  indistinguishable.”	  (Rose	  6).	  In	  this	  sense,	  
obscenity	  trials,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  contain	  and	  validate	  the	  authority	  of	  textual	  
interpretation,	  similarly	  engage	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  authorial	  figure	  behind	  whom	  the	  
court	  is	  free	  to	  engage	  in	  reductive	  literary	  judgment.	  	  
Nowhere	  has	  this	  phenomenon	  been	  more	  pronounced	  than	  the	  obscenity	  trials	  
surrounding	  Naked	  Lunch	  and	  the	  critical	  marginalization	  of	  Burroughs	  in	  their	  aftermath.	  
Literary-­‐legal	  theorist	  Frederick	  Whiting	  argues	  that	  despite	  the	  emancipatory	  narrative	  of	  
Naked	  Lunch’s	  eventual	  acquittal,	  “Burroughs's	  novel	  found	  legal	  and	  cultural	  vindication	  
not	  because	  authorial	  freedom	  of	  expression…	  was	  sacrosanct,	  but	  because	  its	  advocates	  
were	  able	  to	  assimilate	  it	  to	  a	  discourse	  of	  psychopathology	  that	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  the	  normative	  order”	  (Whiting	  147).	  Elevating	  his	  highly	  publicized	  battle	  
with	  addiction	  to	  an	  all-­‐encompassing	  symbol	  for	  Burroughs	  and	  Naked	  Lunch,	  “attackers	  
wished	  to	  dismiss	  his	  work	  as	  the	  vile	  outpourings	  of	  a	  drug	  addict,”	  while	  “admirers	  
praised	  its	  importance	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  Burroughs	  had	  given	  an	  accurate	  account	  of	  the	  
addict’s	  life,	  and	  had	  brought	  the	  truth	  back	  from	  hell”	  (Skerl	  7).	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
interpretive	  imperative	  set	  by	  the	  court,	  Naked	  Lunch	  has	  been	  presented	  exclusively	  as	  a	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semi-­‐autobiographical-­‐drug-­‐narrative,	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Burroughs’	  work	  that	  has	  
persisted	  to	  varying	  degrees	  throughout	  his	  expansive	  career.	  	  
Discussing	  the	  state	  of	  contemporary	  Burroughs	  scholarship,	  Jennie	  Skerl	  identifies	  
“the	  censorship	  of	  Naked	  Lunch,	  the	  legend	  surrounding	  his	  life	  and	  his	  personality,	  his	  
involvement	  in	  popular	  culture,	  his	  early	  association	  with	  the	  Beats,	  his	  expatriation,	  and	  
the	  fragmentation	  of	  his	  critical	  audience,”	  as	  extra-­‐literary	  factors	  “that	  have	  often	  
prevented	  critics	  from	  looking	  at	  [Burroughs’]	  work	  itself”	  (Skerl	  3).	  In	  light	  of	  such	  
barriers,	  those	  interested	  in	  the	  artistic	  complexity	  and	  radical	  experimentation	  of	  
Burroughs’	  text	  must	  first	  deconstruct	  the	  interpretive	  boundaries	  that	  have	  kept	  Naked	  
Lunch	  at	  a	  distance	  from	  its	  readers	  since	  it	  was	  first	  put	  on	  trial	  in	  1960.4	  To	  redress	  the	  
injustices	  done	  to	  the	  influential	  legacy	  of	  William	  S.	  Burroughs	  and	  to	  the	  artistic	  freedom	  
he	  personified,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  reject	  the	  very	  arguments	  used	  by	  his	  defenders	  to	  
exonerate	  Naked	  Lunch.	  Imprisoning	  Burroughs	  and	  his	  work	  in	  the	  confines	  of	  authorial	  
myth,	  the	  attempt	  to	  eliminate	  literary	  censorship	  through	  the	  extension	  of	  First	  
Amendment	  protections	  to	  all	  literature	  counteractively	  established	  an	  even	  more	  
insidious	  regime	  of	  self-­‐censorship	  and	  literary	  control.	  	  
	  
“I	  Know	  It	  When	  I	  See	  It…”	  
A	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  genealogy	  of	  obscenity,	  Attorney	  General	  v.	  A	  Book	  Named	  
‘Naked	  Lunch’	  marks	  the	  apex	  of	  the	  disciplinary	  model	  of	  censorship	  that	  governed	  U.S	  
literary	  production	  for	  nearly	  30	  years.	  Understood	  in	  the	  Foucauldian	  sense,	  the	  gradual	  
implementation	  of	  judicial	  discipline	  has	  fueled	  obscenity	  law	  reform	  since	  the	  landmark	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Big	  Table	  Inc.	  v.	  Carl	  A.	  Schroeder,	  United	  States	  Postmaster	  for	  Chicago	  Illinois.	  186	  F.	  Supp	  
254.	  United	  States	  District	  Court	  N.D.	  Illinois.	  (1960).	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exoneration	  of	  James	  Joyce’s	  Ulysses	  in	  19335.	  	  Before	  the	  advent	  of	  discipline,	  however,	  
obscenity	  law	  existed	  in	  large	  part	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  brute	  literary	  suppression.	  
Conceptualized	  as	  a	  sovereign-­‐juridico	  model	  of	  censorship,	  in	  which	  the	  state’s	  role	  is	  
purely	  punitive,	  literary	  suppression	  finds	  it	  roots	  in	  the	  earliest	  of	  American	  obscenity	  
laws.	  Enacted	  on	  March	  3,	  1873,	  the	  Comstock	  Laws6	  signaled	  the	  beginning	  of	  U.S	  
obscenity	  regulation.	  	  Crafted	  as	  an	  amendment	  to	  1872	  Post	  Office	  Act7,	  the	  Comstock	  
Laws	  gave	  the	  Postal	  Service	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  material	  they	  distributed,	  namely	  
material	  concerning	  contraception	  and	  abortion.	  The	  citation	  of	  England’s	  Regina	  v.	  Hicklin8	  
(1868)	  as	  precedent	  for	  the	  confirmation	  of	  the	  Comstock	  Laws’	  constitutionality	  marked	  
the	  first	  nationwide	  obscenity	  standard.	  Centralizing	  the	  country’s	  many	  local	  ordinances	  
under	  one	  federal	  statute,	  Rosen	  v.	  United	  States9	  (1896)	  adopted	  Hicklin’s	  stance	  that	  
material	  with	  the	  ability	  “to	  deprave	  and	  corrupt	  those	  whose	  minds	  are	  open	  to	  such	  
immoral	  influences10,”	  was	  obscene	  and	  subject	  to	  enjoinment.	  This	  standard	  remained	  
ostensibly	  intact	  until	  United	  States	  v.	  One	  Book	  Called	  Ulysses	  (1933).	  In	  his	  ruling	  Judge	  
John	  Wolsey	  reminded	  the	  court,	  “in	  respect	  of	  the	  recurrent	  emergence	  of	  the	  theme	  of	  sex	  
in	  the	  minds	  of	  [Joyce’s]	  characters,	  it	  must	  be	  remembered	  that	  his	  locale	  was	  Celtic	  and	  
his	  season	  Spring.”(Pagnattaro	  220).	  The	  exoneration	  of	  Ulysses	  set	  a	  significant	  precedent	  
for	  the	  protection	  of	  certain	  material	  under	  the	  First	  Amendment	  based	  solely	  on	  its	  
perceived	  artistic	  value.	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  court	  made	  its	  first	  foray	  into	  literary	  criticism.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  United	  States	  v.	  One	  Book	  Called	  ‘Ulysses’.	  5	  F.	  Supp	  182.	  District	  Court	  New	  York.	  (1933).	  
6	  The	  Comstock	  Act.	  17	  Stat.	  598.	  (Enacted	  March	  3,	  1873).	  
7	  The	  Post	  Office	  Act.	  17	  Stat.	  283.	  (Enacted	  June	  8,	  1872).	  
8	  The	  Queen,	  on	  the	  Prosecution	  of	  Henry	  Scott,	  Appelant	  v.	  Benjamin	  Hicklin	  and	  Another,	  	  	  
Justices	  of	  Wolverhampton,	  Respondents.	  L.R.	  3	  Q.B	  360.	  Court	  of	  the	  Queen’s	  Bench.	  1868.	  
9	  Rosen	  v.	  United	  States,	  161	  U.S.	  29.	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  1896.	  
10	  This	  provision	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘the	  most	  vulnerable	  clause.’	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Unconcerned	  with	  the	  discipline	  of	  cultural	  literacy,	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  sought	  to	  
remove	  objectionable	  material	  from	  the	  mail	  without	  regard	  for	  its	  artistic	  value	  or	  
instructive	  potential.	  Acting	  in	  a	  strictly	  punitive	  manner,	  the	  wholesale	  suppression	  
achieved	  by	  Comstock	  was	  later	  undermined	  by	  the	  Court’s	  fear	  of	  appearing	  reactionary	  
when	  deliberating	  on	  the	  relative	  obscenity	  of	  a	  critically	  lauded	  work.	  As	  Foucault	  notes,	  
the	  implementation	  of	  discipline	  is	  often	  masked	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  an	  egalitarian	  
juridical	  framework.	  Opening	  the	  door	  to	  literary	  discipline,	  Justice	  Wolsey’s	  desire	  to	  
protect	  ‘great	  literature’	  like	  Ulysses	  from	  censorship	  represents	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  state	  to	  
not	  only	  regulate	  what	  material	  is	  read,	  but	  why	  that	  material	  is	  read.	  Borrowing	  
architecture	  from	  Foucault,	  this	  jurisprudential	  shift	  marks	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  pre-­‐
modern	  dungeon	  to	  Benthaian	  panopticon.	  Or,	  as	  legal	  scholar	  Douglas	  Litowitz	  explains,	  
“The	  sovereign-­‐juridico	  model	  no	  longer	  fits	  our	  society	  because	  the	  disciplines	  have	  
moved	  to	  the	  forefront:	  law	  is	  no	  longer	  merely	  the	  punishment	  of	  external	  behavior	  but	  
now	  also	  consists	  of	  exposing	  and	  regulating	  the	  internal	  thoughts	  of	  the	  perpetrator”	  
(Litowitz	  79).	  Described	  as	  an	  organizational	  tool	  designed	  to	  constantly	  monitor,	  and	  thus	  
subtly	  regulate	  a	  given	  population,	  Foucault’s	  panopticon	  exerts	  discipline	  without	  force.	  	  
By	  creating	  a	  protected	  and	  an	  unprotected	  class	  of	  literature,	  Justice	  Wolsey	  broke	  first	  
ground	  on	  the	  eventual	  construction	  of	  a	  literary	  panopticon	  that	  would	  come	  to	  shape	  the	  
reception	  of	  literature	  without	  ever	  lifting	  a	  disciplinary	  finger.	  	  
However,	  it	  was	  not	  until	  Roth	  v.	  United	  States11	  (1957)	  that	  the	  court	  fully	  
acknowledged	  the	  power	  it	  held	  to	  influence	  the	  development	  of	  literary	  culture.	  Legal	  
historian,	  Michael	  Goodman,	  claims	  that	  federal	  rejection	  of	  Regina	  v.	  Hicklin	  by	  Roth	  all	  but	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  Roth	  v.	  United	  States,	  354	  U.S.	  476.	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  1957.	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eliminated	  the	  long	  standing	  ‘most	  vulnerable’	  clause.	  In	  his	  majority	  opinion	  for	  Butler	  v.	  
Michigan’s	  (1957),	  the	  state	  level	  predecessor	  to	  Roth,	  Justice	  Frankfurter	  makes	  the	  
insightful	  argument	  that	  "the	  incidence	  of	  this	  enactment	  [of	  Regina	  v.	  Hicklin]	  is	  to	  reduce	  
the	  adult	  population	  of	  Michigan	  to	  reading	  only	  what	  is	  fit	  for	  children"	  (Coupe	  122).	  As	  a	  
result,	  Roth’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  Hicklin	  test	  made	  it	  necessary	  to	  redraft	  the	  criteria	  used	  to	  
define	  obscenity.	  Ruling,	  “The	  standard	  for	  judging	  obscenity,	  […],	  is	  whether,	  to	  the	  
average	  person,	  applying	  contemporary	  community	  standards,	  the	  dominant	  theme	  of	  the	  
material,	  taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  appeals	  to	  prurient	  interest,”	  Roth	  opened	  the	  floodgates	  for	  a	  
wave	  of	  new	  challenges	  to	  federal	  obscenity	  law.	  In	  the	  decade	  following	  Roth’s	  landmark	  
decision	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  state	  and	  federal	  cases	  would	  come	  to	  radically	  alter	  the	  
landscape	  of	  literary	  obscenity.	  
Despite	  upholding	  the	  interpretations	  of	  Hicklin	  v	  Regina,	  which	  exempted	  obscenity	  
from	  protection	  under	  the	  First	  Amendment,	  Roth	  v	  United	  States	  did	  overturn	  Hicklin’s	  
criteria	  of	  implied	  readership;	  a	  decision	  which	  was	  championed	  as	  a	  needed	  liberalization	  
of	  obscenity	  law.	  However,	  was	  this	  truly	  the	  case?	  While	  it	  is	  unquestionable	  that	  Justice	  
Brenan’s	  reformulation	  of	  obscenity	  standards	  in	  Roth	  did	  broadened	  the	  scope	  of	  First	  
Amendment	  protections,	  it	  also	  drastically	  expanded	  the	  interpretive	  authority	  of	  the	  court.	  
No	  longer	  reliant	  on	  vague	  approximations	  of	  the	  psyches	  of	  women	  and	  children	  to	  
contextualize	  determinations	  of	  obscenity,	  the	  court	  now	  possessed	  the	  to	  power	  to	  define	  
the	  average	  reader.	  In	  conjunction	  with	  this	  ability,	  the	  court	  successfully	  installed	  a	  
singular	  lens	  through	  which	  all	  literary	  interpretations	  were	  channeled	  and	  refracted.	  As	  
the	  first	  in	  a	  series	  of	  major	  constitutional	  reviews	  of	  obscenity	  law	  that	  would	  eventually	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culminate	  in	  Miller	  v.	  California12	  (1973),	  a	  case	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  death	  of	  obscenity	  
law,	  Roth	  v.	  United	  States	  marks	  the	  transition	  from	  a	  system	  of	  literary	  suppression	  to	  a	  
system	  of	  literary	  discipline.	  	  
To	  better	  understand	  this	  distinction,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  address	  the	  
fundamental	  ends	  of	  obscenity	  law.	  If	  it	  is	  assumed	  that	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  obscenity	  law	  is	  
to	  protect	  the	  population	  from	  moral	  corruption	  by	  reducing	  the	  availability	  of	  obscene	  
material,	  Roth	  marks	  a	  significant	  departure	  from	  such	  an	  objective.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  
acquittal	  of	  Joyce’s	  Ulysses,	  there	  emerged	  a	  backlash	  against	  obscenity	  regulations.	  
Rejecting	  the	  draconian	  tendencies	  of	  its	  more	  puritanical	  applications,	  the	  modus	  
operandi	  of	  obscenity	  regulation	  transitioned	  from	  suppression	  to	  disciplinary	  
assimilation.	  Rather	  than	  the	  prohibition	  of	  objectionable	  literature,	  as	  represented	  by	  the	  
Comstock	  Laws,	  obscenity	  courts	  instead	  opted	  to	  neutralize	  the	  objectionable	  through	  the	  
discipline	  of	  context	  and	  interpretation.	  	  
The	  obscenity	  trial,	  as	  a	  discursive	  technology,	  raises	  the	  fundamental	  legal	  
question,	  what	  speech	  does	  The	  First	  Amendment	  protect,	  and	  what	  speech	  does	  it	  not?	  As	  
the	  Roth	  decision	  states:	  
3. Obscenity	  is	  not	  within	  the	  First	  Amendment	  protections	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech	  or	  
press	  -­‐	  either	  (1)	  under	  the	  First	  Amendment,	  as	  to	  the	  Federal	  Government,	  
or	  (2)	  under	  the	  Due	  Process	  Clause	  of	  the	  Fourteenth	  Amendment,	  as	  to	  the	  
States.	  	  
(a) In	  the	  light	  of	  history,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  the	  unconditional	  phrasing	  of	  the	  First	  
Amendment	  was	  not	  intended	  to	  protect	  every	  utterance.	  	  
(b)	  The	  protection	  given	  speech	  and	  press	  was	  fashioned	  to	  assure	  unfettered	  
interchange	  of	  ideas	  for	  the	  bringing	  about	  of	  political	  and	  social	  changes	  
desired	  by	  the	  people.	  (Roth	  484).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Miller	  v.	  California,	  413	  U.S.	  15.	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  1973.	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Predicated	  on	  the	  desire	  to	  facilitate	  change,	  the	  First	  Amendment	  offers	  protection	  
to	  any	  speech	  that	  federal	  courts	  deem	  socially	  important.	  However,	  does	  this	  protection	  
actually	  encourage	  change?	  Addressing	  this	  question	  Barthes	  states,	  	  
“Encratic	  language	  (the	  language	  produced	  and	  spread	  under	  the	  protection	  
of	  power)	  is	  statutorily	  a	  language	  of	  repetition;	  all	  official	  institutions	  of	  
language	  are	  repeating	  machines	  […]	  all	  continually	  repeat	  the	  same	  
structure,	  the	  same	  meaning,	  often	  the	  same	  words:	  the	  stereotype	  is	  a	  
political	  fact,	  the	  major	  figure	  of	  ideology”	  (Pleasure	  of	  the	  Text	  40).	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  Barthes	  analysis,	  Roth’s	  expansion	  of	  First	  Amendment	  protections	  did	  
not	  galvanize	  change,	  but	  suppressed	  it.	  Existing	  outside	  of	  the	  protection	  of	  power,	  
obscenity	  marks	  a	  radical	  threat	  to	  the	  reproduction	  of	  established	  order.	  In	  response	  to	  
the	  ingrained	  repetition	  of	  encratic	  language,	  Barthes	  points	  to	  the	  confrontational	  forces	  
of	  novelty	  and	  discontinuity.	  Frustrating	  the	  organizational	  discipline	  of	  Roth’s	  obscenity	  
standards,	  these	  forces	  create	  blind	  spots	  in	  the	  panoptical	  gaze	  of	  the	  censor.	  In	  the	  
disorder	  of	  such	  blind	  spots	  texts,	  like	  Naked	  Lunch,	  are	  able	  to	  exploit	  the	  “spatial	  unities	  
[of	  the	  panopticon]	  that	  make	  it	  possible	  to	  see	  constantly	  and	  to	  recognize	  immediately.”	  
(Discipline	  and	  Punish	  201).	  Unable	  to	  recognize	  work	  that	  fails	  to	  adhere	  to	  a	  standardized	  
definition	  of	  literature,	  the	  Court	  cannot	  extend	  First	  Amendment	  literary	  protection	  to	  
texts	  it	  does	  not	  see	  as	  literature.	  Rejecting	  the	  “homogeneous	  effects	  of	  power,”	  novelty	  
lacks	  the	  visibility	  of	  First	  Amendment	  protection	  and	  is	  therefore	  avoids	  transcription	  into	  
the	  encratic	  language	  of	  panoptic	  discipline	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  201).	  Fighting	  to	  bring	  
censored	  literature	  back	  into	  the	  light	  of	  day,	  free	  speech	  advocates	  often	  overlook	  the	  fact	  
that	  “full	  lighting	  and	  the	  eye	  of	  a	  supervisor	  capture	  better	  than	  darkness,	  which	  is	  
ultimately	  protected.	  Visibility	  is	  a	  trap.”	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  200).	  Avoiding	  the	  same	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snares	  set	  by	  the	  laws	  they	  enacted,	  obscenity	  courts	  project	  an	  air	  of	  transparency	  while	  
operating	  predominately	  in	  the	  shadows.	  	  
For	  example,	  Roth’s	  appeal	  to	  “redeeming	  social	  value”	  obscures	  the	  underlying	  
value	  assumptions	  made	  by	  the	  court	  regarding	  the	  scope	  of	  literature	  and	  its	  proper	  place	  
within	  society.	  The	  construction	  of	  a	  standard	  rubric	  of	  value	  for	  the	  measurement	  of	  a	  
work’s	  literariness	  served	  to	  restrict	  critical	  appraisal	  to	  a	  single,	  consistent	  yardstick.	  
Rather	  than	  increasing	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  necessary	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  literature	  was	  
obscene,	  the	  Roth	  decision	  increased	  the	  burden	  of	  proof	  necessary	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  
literature	  was,	  in	  fact,	  literature.	  In	  his	  analysis	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  United	  States	  v.	  One	  Book	  
Called	  Ulysses,	  Loren	  Glass	  argues	  “the	  Ulysses	  case	  legitimated	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  ‘modern	  
classic’	  as	  a	  category	  of	  book	  that	  could	  be	  determined	  by	  experts,”	  and	  in	  doing	  so,	  set	  “a	  
legal	  precedent	  against	  suppressing	  a	  book	  for	  isolated	  passages	  [and]	  also	  affirmed	  the	  
modernist	  theory	  of	  the	  aesthetic	  integrity	  of	  the	  text	  as	  the	  author’s	  intended	  and	  inviolate	  
creation”	  (Glass	  180).	  In	  effect,	  the	  elevation	  of	  Joyce	  and	  Ulysses	  to	  the	  apotheosis	  of	  ‘true	  
literature’	  prompted	  subsequent	  obscenity	  cases	  to	  cite	  a	  work’s	  similarity	  to	  Ulysses	  as	  an	  
indication	  of	  serious	  intention	  or	  artistic	  merit.	  For	  instance,	  in	  asserting	  the	  artistic	  merit	  
of	  Naked	  Lunch,	  Norman	  Mailer	  compares	  Burroughs	  to	  Joyce,	  arguing	  for	  their	  similarity,	  
and	  even	  commenting	  that	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  parodies	  “were	  more	  subtle	  than	  those	  of	  Joyce	  in	  
Ulysses”	  (Goodman	  198).	  Asserting	  that	  serious	  literature	  was	  solely	  the	  product	  of	  the	  
serious	  intentions	  of	  a	  serious	  author,	  the	  influence	  of	  United	  States	  v.	  One	  Book	  Called	  
Ulysses	  served	  to	  ground	  the	  epistemology	  of	  legal	  readings	  of	  literature	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  
the	  author	  in	  the	  text.	  Consequently,	  anyone	  defending	  material	  accused	  of	  obscenity	  was	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forced	  to	  reproduce	  an	  interpretation	  of	  the	  work	  that	  fit	  the	  narrow	  requirements	  of	  
Roth’s	  definition	  of	  “redeeming	  social	  importance.”	  	  
Despite	  the	  legal	  significance	  of	  these	  debates,	  very	  few	  of	  the	  cases	  argued	  between	  
1963	  and	  1973	  explicitly	  pertained	  to	  literature,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  logistical	  issues	  
regarding	  the	  advertisement	  and	  distribution	  of	  questionable	  material.13	  Attorney	  General	  
v.	  A	  Book	  Named	  ‘Naked	  Lunch’14	  (1963)	  stands	  as	  a	  unique	  example	  in	  that	  “the	  recognition	  
of	  Naked	  Lunch	  as	  a	  work	  of	  art	  by	  the	  literary	  community	  set	  it	  apart	  from	  other	  
publications	  involved	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  decisions”	  (Goodman	  4).	  As	  such,	  the	  case	  
provides	  valuable	  insight	  into	  the	  underlying	  critical	  assumptions	  held	  by	  the	  judiciary	  in	  
regards	  to	  literature’s	  place	  within	  a	  disciplinary	  apparatus.	  A	  Disciplinary	  Society,	  
according	  to	  Foucault,	  organizes	  vast	  spaces	  into	  a	  series	  of	  closed	  environments	  that	  are	  
then	  subject	  to	  specific	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  obscenity	  trial	  functions	  as	  
branch	  of	  the	  discipline	  society.	  
	  
“The	  Old	  Pin	  and	  Dropper	  Routine”	  
“A	  group	  of	  P.Rs-­‐	  Partially	  reconditioned-­‐	  have	  surrounded	  some	  homosexual	  tourists	  with	  
horrible	  knowing	  smiles	  showing	  the	  Nordic	  skull	  beneath	  in	  double	  exposure.	  
‘What	  do	  you	  want?’	  snaps	  one	  of	  the	  queens.	  
‘We	  want	  to	  understand	  you.’”	  
(Naked	  Lunch	  42).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  “During	  the	  past	  term	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  three	  cases	  were	  decided	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  
clarify	  the	  doubtful	  aspects	  of	  the	  Roth	  test	  concerning	  the	  nature	  of	  ‘obscenity’.	  Ginzburg	  v.	  
United	  States	  is	  significant	  as	  the	  court’s	  initial	  treatment	  of	  the	  advertising	  portion	  of	  the	  
federal	  statute	  making	  certain	  obscene	  materials	  non-­‐mailable	  while	  adding	  a	  new	  
‘pandering’	  test	  to	  the	  Roth	  criteria.	  Mishkin	  v.	  New	  York	  and	  Memoirs	  of	  a	  Woman	  of	  
Pleasure	  v.	  Massachusetts,	  respectively,	  develop	  the	  ‘average	  person’	  and	  ‘redeeming	  social	  
value’	  elements	  of	  the	  Roth	  approach”	  (Coupe	  121).	  	  
14	  Attorney	  General	  v.	  A	  Book	  Named	  ‘Naked	  Lunch.’	  351	  Mass.	  298.	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  the	  
State	  of	  Massachusetts.	  (1966.)	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Despite	  the	  explicit	  sense	  of	  menace	  that	  Burroughs	  attributes	  to	  the	  act	  of	  
understanding,	  critics	  and	  legal	  professionals	  have	  persistently	  turned	  to	  textual	  
interpretation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  attempting	  to	  understand	  Naked	  Lunch.	  As	  Burroughs	  seems	  
to	  suggest,	  interpretation	  is	  an	  inherently	  violent	  act.	  Denoting	  two	  distinctly	  different	  
actions,	  the	  verb,	  “to	  interpret,”	  requires	  either	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  familiar	  into	  the	  
foreign,	  or	  the	  translation	  of	  the	  foreign	  into	  the	  familiar.	  Literary	  interpretation	  rejects	  
this	  dichotomy,	  however,	  opting	  instead	  to	  exclusively	  reduce	  a	  work’s	  plurality	  down	  to	  a	  
single	  point	  of	  origin,	  easily	  consumed	  and	  assimilated	  into	  a	  familiar	  structure	  of	  critical	  
understanding.	  Without	  this	  point	  of	  origin	  to	  ground	  a	  critical	  apparatus,	  literary	  
judgments	  lack	  authority.	  Holding	  equally	  true	  in	  the	  legal	  sense,	  a	  suspect	  on	  trial	  lacking	  a	  
definitive	  point	  of	  origin,	  or	  alibi,	  also	  lacks	  credibility.	  Shining	  a	  penetrating	  spotlight	  into	  
the	  fictive	  landscape,	  the	  panoptical	  discipline	  of	  obscenity	  law	  functions	  to	  identify	  these	  
points	  of	  origin	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  containment	  and	  control.	  Searching	  for	  this	  point	  of	  
origin,	  the	  Court	  settled	  upon	  Burroughs’	  struggles	  with	  addiction	  as	  the	  structural	  center	  
of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  critical/legal	  identity.	  	  
In	  the	  dedication	  of	  Howl,	  Allen	  Ginsberg	  first	  references	  what	  would	  later	  become	  
Naked	  Lunch,	  mentioning	  “an	  endless	  novel	  which	  will	  drive	  everybody	  mad.”	  As	  Ginsberg	  
warns,	  the	  many	  genetic	  iterations	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  that	  pre-­‐date	  its	  1962	  publication	  
establish	  a	  deferred	  presence	  that	  endlessly	  delays	  the	  interpretive	  mastery	  by	  driving	  
those	  in	  search	  of	  a	  definitive	  origin	  or	  explanation	  mad.	  Of	  these	  various	  publications,	  the	  
introductory	  “Deposition:	  Testimony	  Concerning	  a	  Sickness”	  offers	  the	  most	  fascinating	  
and	  yet	  ultimately	  frustrating	  interpretive	  invitation.	  Just	  as	  Jacques	  Derrida’s	  notion	  of	  
differance	  posits	  the	  endless	  difference	  and	  deferral	  of	  the	  signified,	  the	  paratextual	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elements	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  refuse	  to	  give	  up	  their	  secret,	  endlessly	  alluding	  to	  an	  alibi	  that	  is	  
never	  truly	  given,	  or	  given	  truly.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  legal	  imperative	  to	  reveal	  one’s	  origin	  is	  
met	  with	  necessary	  but	  never	  sufficient	  conditions.	  Harris	  cautions,	  “Reconstructing	  the	  
real	  scene	  of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  origins	  brings	  us	  back	  to	  the	  account	  given	  by	  Burroughs	  in	  
‘The	  Deposition.’	  In	  its	  legal	  sense,	  this	  tells	  no	  lies	  but	  it’s	  nevertheless	  wholly	  misleading”	  	  
(Beginnings	  21).	  	  
Mirroring	  the	  tension	  between	  absence	  and	  presence	  hinted	  at	  in	  its	  title,	  
Burroughs’	  introductory	  essay	  is	  comprised	  of	  two	  distinct	  parts,	  “Deposition:	  Testimony	  
Concerning	  a	  Sickness15”	  and	  “Postscript…wouldn’t	  you?”.	  While	  dissimilar	  and	  often	  
contradictory,	  these	  two	  sections	  are	  both	  ostensibly	  true	  yet	  riddled	  with	  factual	  errors.	  
Juxtaposing	  the	  clinical,	  consistent,	  and	  uncharacteristically	  lucid	  prose	  of	  the	  “Deposition”	  
against	  the	  increasingly	  unhinged	  and	  fragmented	  text	  of	  the	  “Postscript,”	  Burroughs	  offers	  
up	  the	  compelling	  origin	  story	  of	  a	  redeemed-­‐addict-­‐made-­‐good,	  only	  to	  immediately	  call	  
the	  validity	  of	  his	  own	  account	  into	  question.	  Adopting	  a	  position	  exterior	  to	  the	  
authoritative	  tone	  of	  the	  “Deposition,”	  the	  “Postscript”	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  “World	  
Health	  Problem	  I	  was	  talking	  about	  back	  in	  The	  Article,”	  as	  well	  as	  “some	  bush	  league	  short	  
con	  artist	  who	  is	  known	  to	  have	  invented	  The	  Bill,”	  challenging	  the	  authenticity	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  The	  terms	  deposition	  and	  testimony,	  while	  both	  primarily	  associated	  with	  the	  logistics	  of	  
legal	  procedure,	  are,	  in	  fact,	  divergent	  means	  of	  discourse.	  Legal	  testimony,	  defined	  non-­‐
rigorously,	  generally	  indicates	  statements	  addressed	  to	  a	  courtroom	  made	  under	  a	  binding	  
oath	  of	  truthfulness.	  Often	  presented	  to	  the	  court	  via	  structured	  dialogue	  between	  a	  lawyer	  
and	  a	  witness,	  testimony	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  physical	  presence	  of	  both	  interlocutors.	  
Depositions,	  however,	  are	  presented	  to	  the	  court	  as	  a	  form	  of	  written	  testimony	  in	  which	  
an	  absent	  witness	  is	  represented	  by	  a	  written	  statement.	  In	  this	  very	  literal	  sense,	  
depositions	  are	  imbued	  with	  a	  deferred	  presence.	  The	  separation	  of	  deposition	  from	  
testimony	  by	  a	  mere	  colon,	  if	  read	  in	  a	  syntactically	  descriptive	  manner,	  misleadingly	  
suggests	  that	  the	  truthful	  presence	  of	  a	  testimony	  can	  be	  located	  within	  the	  larger	  
parameters	  of	  the	  deposition.	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Burroughs	  as	  the	  essay’s	  expressed	  narrator	  (Naked	  Lunch	  13).	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  
“Deposition”	  further	  perpetuates	  the	  deferred	  presence	  of	  the	  text’s	  most	  fundamental	  
point	  of	  origin,	  its	  author.	  Signed	  “William	  S.	  Burroughs,”	  the	  confessional	  rhetoric	  of	  the	  
“Deposition”	  implies	  privileged	  access	  to	  the	  author	  through	  the	  text	  (Naked	  Lunch	  14).	  
Never	  equivocally	  acknowledging	  that	  “The	  Bill”	  is,	  or	  is	  not,	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  shadowy	  
conman	  who	  remains	  secretly	  hidden	  behind	  the	  text’s	  implied	  origin,	  the	  “Postscript”	  adds	  
an	  additional	  layer	  of	  fascination	  by	  deferring	  the	  authenticity	  of	  testimony	  with	  an	  alibi	  
that	  is	  always	  beyond	  or	  external	  to	  the	  text.	  Akin	  to	  pleading	  the	  fifth,	  this	  coy	  
renunciation	  of	  textual	  ownership	  parodies	  “the	  entire	  genre	  of	  genetic	  anecdote,”	  by	  
“dismiss[ing]	  the	  definitive	  account	  as	  a	  myth	  like	  any	  other”	  (Harris	  “Beginnings”	  22).	  
While	  many	  Burroughs	  scholars	  read	  this	  parody	  as	  an	  abstract	  criticism	  of	  objective	  
knowledge,	  few	  question	  their	  own	  commitment	  to	  such	  an	  interpretation.	  To	  dismiss	  all	  
definitive	  accounts	  as	  myth	  is	  itself	  an	  act	  of	  closure	  antithetical	  to	  the	  proposition	  in	  
question.	  Rather	  than	  falling	  back	  on	  the	  alibi	  of	  strict	  parody,	  an	  inside	  joke	  in	  which	  all	  
interpretation	  is	  subjective	  and	  lacks	  established	  meaning,	  Burroughs	  defers	  interpretive	  
mastery	  through	  a	  relentless	  insistence	  on	  the	  literal	  and	  a	  seductive	  if	  not	  irresistible	  
invitation	  to	  interpret.	  	  
Burroughs’	  siren	  song	  is	  set	  in	  motion	  immediately	  with	  the	  claim	  that,	  “I	  awoke	  
from	  The	  Sickness	  at	  the	  age	  of	  forty-­‐five,	  calm	  and	  sane,	  and	  in	  reasonably	  good	  health	  
except	  for	  a	  weakened	  liver	  and	  the	  look	  of	  borrowed	  flesh	  common	  to	  all	  who	  survive	  The	  
Sickness”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  7).	  The	  text	  immediately	  establishes	  the	  speaker	  as	  posterior	  to,	  
and	  as	  a	  result,	  in	  control	  of,	  the	  narrative	  that	  follows.	  The	  passage’s	  past	  tense,	  first	  
person	  narration	  evokes	  the	  narrative	  authority	  of	  a	  memoir,	  diary	  entry,	  or	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autobiography.	  Such	  narrative	  forms	  carry	  with	  them	  the	  implicit	  expectation	  of	  truth	  and	  
transparency.16	  The	  speaker’s	  temporal	  distance	  from	  the	  events	  they	  relay	  imbues	  them	  
with	  a	  sense	  of	  omnipotence	  that	  comes	  from	  the	  direct	  access	  to	  their	  own	  past	  thoughts	  
and	  motivations.	  Having	  already	  read	  the	  story	  that	  they	  are	  re-­‐telling,	  the	  first	  person	  
narrator	  holds	  a	  position	  of	  interpretive	  power,	  their	  access	  to	  the	  truth	  is	  greater	  than	  that	  
of	  the	  reader,	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  their	  ability	  to	  ascribe	  meaning	  and	  significance	  is	  privileged.	  
This	  authorial	  dominance	  over	  the	  text	  is	  only	  heightened	  by	  the	  series	  of	  binaries	  that	  
establish	  the	  narrative’s	  context.	  Written	  during	  “The	  Sickness”	  from	  which	  the	  narrator	  
has	  been	  woken,	  the	  body	  text	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  is	  juxtaposed	  against	  the	  book’s	  
introduction,	  written	  external	  to	  the	  sickness.	  This	  juxtaposition	  functions	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  
levels	  to	  establish	  the	  metaphoric	  dominance	  of	  the	  introduction	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  text.	  	  
While	  never	  explicitly	  addressed,	  a	  process	  of	  oppositional	  definition	  characterizes	  
the	  body	  text	  by	  what	  it	  is	  not.	  If	  the	  introduction	  is	  written	  in	  a	  state	  of	  wakefulness,	  the	  
body’s	  origin	  is	  one	  of	  sleep	  and	  unconsciousness.	  If	  the	  introduction	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  
narrator	  who	  is	  “calm,	  sane,	  and	  in	  reasonably	  good	  health,”	  the	  body	  is	  the	  result	  of	  
sickness,	  frenzy,	  and	  insanity.	  The	  construction	  of	  this	  dualism	  suggests	  the	  comforting	  
dominance	  of	  the	  present	  over	  the	  past,	  the	  mind	  over	  the	  body,	  and	  the	  author	  over	  his	  
text.	  	  
The	  absence/presence	  of	  the	  “Deposition”	  in	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  two	  most	  prominent	  
legal	  challenges	  provides	  an	  account	  of	  the	  impact	  the	  section	  had	  upon	  the	  book’s	  
legal/literary	  interpretation.	  A	  cursory	  analysis	  of	  judicial	  outcomes	  demonstrates	  the	  legal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  Specializing	  in	  the	  autobiographical,	  genetic	  theorist	  Philippe	  Lejeune	  remarks,	  “The	  
object	  of	  an	  autobiographical	  text	  is	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  its	  contract	  implies	  both	  the	  
possibility	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  verification”	  (Lejeune	  196).	  	  Burroughs	  willfully	  exploits	  
this	  contract.	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significance	  of	  the	  section.	  In	  the	  1960	  case	  against	  Big	  Table,	  Naked	  Lunch	  lacked	  the	  
“Deposition,”	  and	  was	  found	  obscene,	  but	  in	  1966’s	  Boston	  trial	  Naked	  Lunch	  included	  the	  
“Deposition”	  and	  was	  cleared	  of	  obscenity	  charges	  much	  more	  easily.	  This	  raises	  the	  
question,	  what	  is	  it	  about	  the	  “Deposition”	  that	  is	  so	  legally	  persuasive?	  The	  same	  question	  
should	  also	  be	  directed	  towards	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  literary	  audience.	  A	  majority	  of	  critics	  who	  
have	  engaged	  Naked	  Lunch	  have	  done	  so	  through	  the	  “Deposition,”	  that	  is	  they	  have	  relied	  
on	  the	  symbols	  and	  analogies	  Burroughs	  foregrounds	  in	  his	  essay	  as	  a	  key	  to	  unlocking	  the	  
text’s	  hidden	  or	  underlying	  message.	  	  
Or	  perhaps,	  rather	  than	  a	  key,	  many	  critics	  have	  used	  the	  “Deposition”	  as	  a	  map	  to	  
navigate	  the	  radical	  terrain	  of	  Burroughs’	  text.	  Or	  perhaps,	  better	  still,	  the	  “Deposition”	  has	  
functioned	  as	  a	  legend	  for	  the	  map	  that	  is	  the	  text	  of	  Naked	  Lunch.	  This	  tertiary	  depiction	  of	  
critical	  engagement	  with	  the	  “Deposition”	  draws	  on	  Alfred	  Korzybski’s	  remark	  that,	  “the	  
map	  is	  not	  the	  territory”(Korzybski	  1931).	  A	  student	  of	  Korzybski,	  Burroughs	  shared	  a	  
similar	  mistrust	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  language	  governed	  human	  interaction.	  The	  
“Deposition”	  brims	  with	  master-­‐symbols	  like	  “The	  Sickness,”	  “The	  Junk	  Virus,”	  “The	  
pyramid	  of	  junk,”	  and	  “The	  Algebra	  of	  Need,”	  which	  function	  as	  cardinal	  directions	  for	  the	  
bulk	  of	  Burroughs	  scholarship,	  organizing	  a	  disparate	  field	  of	  criticism	  around	  central	  
signposts	  (Naked	  Lunch	  7-­‐8).	  It	  is	  even	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  these	  signposts	  constitute	  a	  
symbol-­‐system	  of	  their	  own,	  shorthand	  for	  Burroughs	  scholars	  to	  more	  efficiently	  discuss	  
an	  otherwise	  unwieldy	  text	  without	  stable	  plots,	  characters,	  or	  settings	  to	  reference	  and	  
ground	  discussion.	  
	   Of	  these	  interpretive	  signposts,	  the	  most	  dominant	  still	  remains	  the	  drug	  narrative	  
relayed	  by	  Burroughs	  in	  the	  opening	  pages	  of	  the	  “Deposition.”	  As	  indicated	  previously,	  the	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inclusion	  of	  the	  “Deposition”	  to	  the	  text	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  during	  the	  interim	  between	  the	  Big	  
Table	  trials	  and	  the	  Boston	  trials	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  correlative	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  judgments	  
regarding	  the	  book’s	  obscenity.	  	  While	  the	  absence/presence	  of	  Burroughs’	  widely	  
discussed	  paratext	  has	  been	  analyzed	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  legal	  contexts,	  the	  absence/presence	  of	  
narcotics-­‐use	  that	  drives	  the	  introduction	  is	  often	  over-­‐looked.	  As	  Davis	  Schneiderman	  
notes,	  “If	  Lee	  is	  on	  drugs,	  quitting	  drugs,	  hallucinating	  through	  drugs,	  then	  our	  world	  
remains	  protected	  outside	  this	  altered	  state,”	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  is	  freed	  from	  the	  
responsibility	  of	  having	  to	  answer	  to	  the	  criticism	  that	  this	  exterior/altered	  state	  garners	  
(Schneiderman	  192).	  If	  an	  aberration	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  an	  external	  origin,	  the	  cause	  of	  
that	  problematic	  difference	  is	  shifted	  and	  postponed.	  
	   This	  trend	  becomes	  glaringly	  obvious	  in	  both	  the	  prosecution’s	  and	  the	  defense’s	  
attempts	  to	  reconcile	  the	  text	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  with	  the	  discursive	  parameters	  of	  the	  legal	  
system.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  placate	  the	  interpretive	  expectations	  of	  obscenity	  regulations,	  
sociologist	  Paul	  Hollander	  of	  Harvard	  University	  was	  called	  upon	  to	  testify	  to	  the	  value	  of	  
Naked	  Lunch	  to	  his	  profession	  and	  to	  society	  at	  large.	  Synthesizing	  Hollander’s	  response,	  
Michael	  Goodman	  writes,	  “the	  specific	  sociological	  significance	  of	  the	  book	  lay	  in	  its	  
concern	  with	  drug	  addiction,”	  and	  that	  because	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  depiction	  of	  addiction	  
“corresponded	  to	  the	  scientific	  data	  available	  on	  the	  subject,”	  the	  book	  “made	  concrete	  and	  
believable	  some	  of	  the	  abstract	  scientific	  notions	  of	  the	  field”	  (Goodman	  185).	  Hollander’s	  
testimony	  reduces	  the	  entirety	  Naked	  Lunch	  down	  to	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  elemental	  
discussion	  of	  drug	  addiction,	  only	  to	  have	  the	  discussion	  itself	  similarly	  reduced	  to	  a	  single	  
data	  point	  and	  subsumed	  into	  the	  larger	  medical	  discussion	  of	  addiction.	  	  
	   Trading	  the	  relationship	  of	  differences	  between	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  heterogeneous	  textual	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symptoms	  for	  a	  relationship	  of	  similarity	  to	  established	  scientific	  notions,	  Hollander’s	  
medical	  discourse	  assimilates	  textual	  material	  that	  is	  ‘useful’	  while	  discarding	  that	  which	  
does	  not	  fit.	  This	  refuse,	  an	  overwhelming	  majority	  of	  the	  text,	  frustrates	  what	  
Schneiderman	  identifies	  as	  “the	  readerly	  hope”	  that	  a	  text	  will	  facilitate	  “the	  ultimate	  
possibility	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  as	  an	  elusive	  reward	  for	  intrepid	  exploration”	  and	  that	  as	  a	  
result	  many	  critics	  engage	  in	  “a	  key	  analytical	  flaw:	  reading	  what	  makes	  ‘sense’	  in	  Naked	  
Lunch	  while	  dismissing	  the	  ‘excess’	  text	  as	  hallucinations	  produced	  through	  William	  Lee’s	  
drug	  cure”	  (Schneiderman	  190).	  While	  Schneiderman’s	  identification	  of	  a	  critical	  drive	  
towards	  overzealous	  textual	  grooming	  appears	  well	  founded,	  the	  motivations	  he	  ascribes	  
to	  the	  act	  are	  suspect.	  Rather	  than	  an	  active	  effort	  to	  draw	  an	  elusive	  meaning	  out	  of	  Naked	  
Lunch,	  the	  insistence	  on	  the	  centrality	  of	  “Deposition’”s	  drug	  narrative	  suggests	  a	  more	  
defensive	  reading	  posture.	  	  
	  
“Ordinary	  Men	  and	  Women”	  
	   In	  “Afterthoughts	  on	  a	  Deposition,”	  a	  1991	  paratextual	  addition	  to	  Naked	  Lunch,	  
Burroughs	  sustains	  the	  text’s	  genetic	  differance	  by	  simultaneously	  revealing	  and	  
concealing	  the	  book’s	  ambiguous	  origins.	  Adding	  yet	  another	  alibi	  to	  the	  book’s	  numerous,	  
and	  often	  contradictory,	  paratextual	  origin	  stories,	  “Afterthoughts”	  asserts	  that	  the	  “junk	  
problem”	  outlined	  in	  the	  “Deposition,”	  “began	  with	  the	  Harrison	  Narcotics	  Act	  of	  1914”	  
(Naked	  Lunch	  15).	  In	  his	  essay,	  “Monstrosity	  on	  Trial,”	  Fredrick	  Whiting	  traces	  the	  
medical/legal	  push	  develop	  the	  acceptance	  of	  ‘the	  addict’	  as	  an	  established	  institutional	  
identity	  whose	  origins,	  he	  argues,	  are	  found	  in	  the	  Harrison	  Narcotics	  Act.	  The	  Harrison	  
Act’s	  decision	  to	  place	  the	  distribution	  of	  opiates	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  medical	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establishment	  also	  served	  to	  place	  users	  of	  opiates	  under	  the	  same	  degree	  of	  institutional	  
regulation.	  Whiting	  points	  to	  this	  moment	  as	  the	  impetus	  for	  the	  societal	  shift	  from	  a	  
person	  who	  is	  physically	  dependent	  upon	  the	  continued	  use	  of	  opiates	  towards	  the	  
construction	  of	  “the	  addict”	  as	  a	  firmly	  defined	  identity.	  Echoing	  the	  taxonomic	  rationale	  of	  
Hollander’s	  testimony,	  in	  which	  a	  clinical	  rubric	  of	  discrete	  medical	  phenomena	  was	  
superimposed	  onto	  the	  text	  of	  Naked	  Lunch,	  Whiting	  analyses	  the	  1940	  article,	  “The	  Drug	  
Addict:	  Patient	  or	  Criminal”	  by	  A.R	  Lindesmith,	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  manner	  in	  
which	  the	  accumulation	  of	  scientific	  knowledge	  functions	  as	  a	  powerful	  mechanism	  in	  the	  
formation	  of	  restrictive,	  institutional	  identities:	  	  
“Citing	  and	  synopsizing	  work	  spanning	  the	  previous	  two	  decades,	  Lindesmith	  
observed	  that	  the	  predominant	  medical	  theory	  of	  the	  day	  placed	  the	  majority	  
of	  addicts	  in	  classificatory	  categories	  either	  derivative	  of	  or	  closely	  
correlated	  with	  psychopathy.	  Statistical	  representations	  of	  the	  phenomenon	  
of	  addiction	  indicated	  that	  "normal"	  addicted	  individuals	  represented	  only	  
13	  or	  14	  percent	  of	  the	  overall	  population	  of	  addicts,	  while	  the	  rest	  were	  
divided	  into	  groups	  such	  as	  "inadequate	  personalities,"	  "criminalism,"	  and	  
"homosexuality,"	  all	  of	  which	  were	  explained	  by	  the	  underlying	  condition	  of	  
psychopathy.”	  (Whiting	  151).	  
	  
	   Engaged	  in	  a	  deferred	  search	  for	  an	  alibi,	  Lindesmith’s	  observations	  locate	  the	  origin	  
of	  difference	  at	  the	  site	  of	  psychopathy.	  Generally	  signifying	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  
psychology	  of	  ‘normal’	  individuals,	  psychopathy	  organizes	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  
individual/societal	  deviations	  around	  one	  central	  point	  of	  cause.	  The	  legal/medical	  
construction	  of	  the	  addict	  appeals	  to	  “individual	  pathology	  rather	  than	  admitting	  social	  or	  
systemic	  causes,”	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  “the	  deviance	  exhibited	  by	  addicts,	  as	  a	  species	  in	  the	  
genus	  psychopath,	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  identity	  rather	  than	  practice”	  (Whiting	  152).	  Imitating	  
the	  textual	  grooming	  performed	  on	  Naked	  Lunch	  by	  the	  Massachusetts	  State	  Supreme	  
Court,	  as	  well	  as	  by	  many	  Burroughs	  scholars,	  Lindesmith’s	  psychopathy	  forges	  a	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relationship	  of	  similarity	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  difference.	  The	  adoption	  of	  any	  dominant	  
interpretive	  strategy,	  like	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  drug	  narrative	  or	  Lindesmith’s	  psychopathy,	  
provides	  justification	  for	  the	  marginalization	  of	  text	  and	  human	  alike.	  That	  which	  does	  not	  
fit	  the	  established	  criteria	  is	  not	  necessary,	  or	  as	  Burroughs	  fraudulently	  paraphrases	  
Wittgenstein’s	  Tractacus	  Logico-­Philosophicus,	  “If	  a	  proposition	  is	  NOT	  NECESSARY	  it	  is	  
MEANINGLESS	  and	  approaching	  MEANING	  ZERO”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  13).	  As	  such,	  this	  process	  
of	  marginalization	  becomes	  paramount	  when	  reexamining	  Whiting’s	  assessment	  of	  the	  
critical	  motivations	  that	  have	  propped	  up	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  flimsy	  drug	  narrative	  for	  so	  
long.	  Rather	  than	  an	  act	  of	  discovery,	  as	  Whiting	  suggests,	  in	  which	  unfit	  material	  is	  pushed	  
to	  the	  side	  in	  search	  of	  a	  truth	  buried	  beneath	  it,	  interpretive	  marginalization	  functions	  as	  
an	  act	  of	  definition.	  By	  pushing	  excess	  material	  to	  the	  side,	  that	  which	  is	  inassimilable	  
articulates	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  normative	  order	  that	  exists	  within/	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  
boundaries.	  Without	  these	  firm	  borders	  the	  binary	  logic	  that	  supports	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  drug	  
narrative	  as	  either	  true/untrue	  and	  the	  addict	  as	  either	  sane/insane	  begins	  to	  break	  down,	  
dismantling	  the	  relationships	  of	  dominance	  it	  supports.	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  marginalization	  
of	  institutionally	  assigned	  identity	  operates	  defensively,	  fortifying	  the	  walls	  that	  protect	  
and	  perpetuate	  the	  dominance	  of	  a	  normative	  order.	  	  
	   With	  this	  in	  mind,	  the	  critical	  and	  legal	  persistence	  of	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  drug	  
narrative	  is	  transformed	  from	  naive	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  “pin	  and	  dropper	  routine”17	  
into	  a	  more	  calculated	  attempt	  to	  define	  and	  enclose	  the	  text,	  neutralizing	  its	  radically	  
deconstructive	  potential	  (Naked	  Lunch	  23).	  A	  brief	  examination	  of	  the	  court	  records	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  The	  pin	  and	  dropper	  are	  tools	  used	  to	  inject	  heroin	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  syringe.	  When	  
preformed	  as	  a	  “routine”	  they	  function	  as	  metonymic	  symbols	  of	  the	  literary	  tendency	  to	  
over	  romanticize	  abstract,	  often	  gruesome,	  characterizations	  of	  addicts	  while	  neglecting	  
the	  literal,	  more	  mundane,	  and	  ultimately	  humanizing	  details	  of	  addiction.	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Naked	  Lunch’s	  two	  most	  prominent	  legal	  challenges	  quickly	  reveals	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
Burroughs’	  identity	  as	  an	  addict	  shaped	  the	  book’s	  reception	  and	  interpretation.	  One	  
particular	  exchange	  between	  the	  defense	  and	  prosecution	  of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  initial	  Big	  Table	  
case	  clearly	  testifies	  to	  the	  legal	  dominance	  of	  abstract	  identity	  over	  literal	  action,	  or	  rather	  
the	  substitution	  of	  agency	  for	  image.	  When	  asked	  if	  it	  were	  necessary	  to	  establish	  before	  
the	  court	  that	  William	  S.	  Burroughs	  was	  an	  addict,	  testifying	  criminologist	  Hans	  W.	  Mattick	  
was	  prompted	  to	  respond	  that	  “if	  [Burroughs]	  has	  never	  used	  drugs,	  [Naked	  Lunch]	  is	  a	  
very	  remarkable,	  sympathetic	  and	  vicarious	  experience	  which	  [Burroughs]	  is	  delineating	  
and	  is	  a	  true	  image	  as	  far	  as	  I	  know”	  (Goodman	  60-­‐61).	  Thus,	  whether	  or	  not	  Burroughs	  
had	  ever	  actually	  consumed	  a	  single	  gram	  of	  heroin	  his	  name	  and	  his	  writing	  were	  
synonymous	  with	  and	  justified	  by	  the	  signifier,	  addict.	  Similarly,	  Burroughs’	  essentialized	  
identity	  as	  an	  addict	  was	  appealed	  to	  frequently	  over	  the	  course	  of	  both	  trials	  to	  justify	  and	  
neatly	  explain	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  successes,	  failures,	  and	  numerous	  unaccountable	  
inconsistencies.	  	  
	   Institutional	  identities	  like	  the	  addict	  not	  only	  serve	  to	  smother	  difference,	  but	  also	  to	  
reinforce	  ingrained	  power	  asymmetries.	  Whiting	  argues	  that,	  “Because	  [‘the	  addict’]	  fit	  the	  
form	  of	  deviance	  into	  a	  larger	  taxonomy	  of	  illness	  and	  a	  corresponding	  causal	  structure,	  
[…]	  even	  in	  its	  departure	  from	  the	  orderly	  operation	  of	  nature;	  [‘the	  addict’]	  became	  
explicable	  and	  to	  that	  extent	  namable”	  (Whiting	  152).	  Grounded	  in	  the	  medicalized	  
phenomenon	  of	  psychopathy,	  however,	  the	  addict	  remained	  nameable	  only	  to	  a	  certain	  
extent.	  Unable	  to	  trace	  psychopathy	  back	  to	  a	  root	  cause	  that	  might	  allow	  for	  its	  
assimilation	  into	  the	  larger	  medical	  discourse,	  the	  “inability	  to	  provide	  a	  complete	  causal	  
account	  of	  the	  addict	  left	  him	  at	  least	  partly	  inexplicable,	  a	  disruption	  of	  the	  scientifically	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knowable	  universe”	  (Whiting	  152).	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  legal	  anxiety	  over	  Burroughs’	  status	  as	  
an	  addict	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  analogous	  to	  the	  anxiety	  felt	  towards	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  status	  as	  
literature.	  A	  book	  without	  an	  origin	  is	  a	  book	  without	  explanation,	  and	  without	  a	  sufficient	  
explanation	  a	  book	  cannot	  be	  assimilated	  into	  institutionalized	  interpretational	  structures.	  
	   This	  assignment	  of	  authorial	  identity	  intended	  to	  ground	  the	  disciplinary	  apparatus	  of	  
the	  obscenity	  trial	  produces	  a	  single	  point	  of	  literary	  origin.	  However,	  as	  Gilles	  Deleuze	  
points	  out,	  origins	  do	  not	  exist	  in	  any	  true	  or	  positive	  sense.	  Part	  of	  a	  larger	  dualism,	  an	  
origin	  lacks	  meaning	  without	  a	  destination.	  Describing	  a	  relationship	  of	  spatial/temporal	  
unity	  between	  two	  pre-­‐existing	  points,	  an	  otherwise	  antonymous	  event	  is	  press	  ganged	  
into	  service	  when	  assigned	  a	  relationship	  of	  casual	  similarity	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
origin/destination.	  Burroughs’	  history	  of	  drug	  abuse	  and	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  obscene	  potential	  
would	  be	  inconsequential	  without	  a	  destination,	  or	  an	  audience.	  Concluding,	  “disciplinary	  
societies	  have	  two	  poles:	  the	  signature	  that	  designates	  the	  individual,	  and	  the	  number	  or	  
administrative	  numeration	  that	  indicates	  his	  or	  her	  position	  within	  a	  mass,”	  Deleuze	  
acknowledges	  the	  often	  overlooked	  counterpart	  to	  the	  literary	  notion	  of	  the	  implied-­‐
author,	  the	  implied-­‐reader	  (Societies	  of	  Control	  5).	  Grossly	  simplified,	  the	  act	  of	  
communication	  consists	  of	  the	  transmission	  of	  content	  from	  point	  A	  to	  point	  B.	  In	  turn,	  the	  
length	  and	  direction	  of	  this	  trajectory	  constitute	  the	  parameters	  of	  interpretation.	  	  
Therefore,	  control	  over	  either	  A	  or	  B,	  author	  or	  audience,	  grants	  substantial	  influence	  over	  
the	  perception	  of	  a	  work.	  However,	  to	  control	  both	  A	  and	  B	  is	  not	  to	  influence	  the	  trajectory	  
of	  a	  work,	  but	  to	  recreate	  it	  entirely.18	  In	  this	  light,	  the	  judiciary’s	  concern	  with	  who	  is	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Jorge	  Bores	  undertakes	  a	  similar	  project	  in	  his	  famous	  short	  story	  “Pierre	  Menard,	  
Author	  of	  the	  Quixote.”	  While	  the	  original	  text	  of	  Don	  Quixote	  remains	  unchanged,	  the	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likely	  to	  access	  obscene	  material	  appears	  less	  like	  an	  enlightened	  attempt	  to	  prevent	  
unnecessary	  censorship,	  and	  more	  like	  a	  strategic	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  boundaries	  of	  
interpretation.	  While	  a	  handful	  of	  scholars	  have	  analyzed	  how	  Burroughs’	  status	  as	  an	  
addict	  has	  influenced	  the	  reception	  of	  Naked	  Lunch,	  the	  (re)creation	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  as	  a	  
book	  written	  by	  a	  recovering	  addict	  and	  read	  by	  “the	  average	  person	  applying	  
contemporary	  community	  standards,”	  remains	  critically	  unexamined.	  	  
Before	  considering	  the	  influence	  of	  Roth’s	  “average	  reader”	  on	  the	  trajectory	  of	  
Naked	  Lunch’s	  interpretation,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  revisit	  the	  initial	  reasons	  the	  ruling	  was	  
enacted,	  namely	  the	  court’s	  rejection	  of	  Hicklin’s	  most	  vulnerable	  clause.	  As	  Goodman	  
notes,	  “The	  Roth	  decision	  in	  1957	  all	  but	  castrated	  the	  most	  vulnerable	  notion	  [established	  
by	  Regina	  v	  Hicklin]	  with	  the	  assertion	  that	  its	  ultimate	  effect	  would	  reduce	  all	  reading	  
material	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  child”	  (Goodman	  46).	  Backed	  by	  a	  number	  of	  lower	  court	  
decisions,	  the	  logic	  of	  this	  rationale	  reveals	  an	  important	  assumption	  made	  by	  the	  legal	  
system	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  establishing	  an	  intended	  reader	  for	  any	  given	  work.	  If	  the	  
designation	  of	  a	  child	  as	  the	  intended	  reader	  of	  a	  work	  were	  understood	  to	  cause	  that	  work	  
to	  be	  lowered	  to	  the	  level	  of	  a	  child,	  it	  would	  follow	  then,	  that	  appointing	  an	  average	  reader	  
would	  impose	  similar	  limitations.	  This	  logic	  suggests	  that	  an	  average	  intended-­‐reader	  will	  
yield	  an	  average	  and	  intended	  reading.	  However,	  who	  is	  the	  ‘average	  reader’,	  or	  more	  
precisely,	  who	  or	  what	  is	  average?	  
The	  term	  “Average,”	  when	  cited	  by	  Roth,	  seems	  to	  suggest	  a	  colloquialism	  intended	  
to	  indicate	  some	  measure	  of	  central	  tendency	  for	  a	  given	  population.	  In	  these	  terms,	  there	  
exist	  three	  general	  measurements	  of	  centrality,	  mean,	  median	  and	  mode.	  Rather	  than	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
addition	  of	  a	  new	  author	  and	  a	  new	  critical	  audience	  radically	  alters	  how	  the	  text	  is	  
understood,	  constituting	  an	  entirely	  new	  narrative.	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embarking	  on	  a	  tedious	  mathematical	  digression	  in	  hope	  of	  answering	  this	  question,	  the	  
political	  parties	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  provide	  a	  helpful	  point	  of	  comparison.	  Comprised	  by	  two	  
warring	  factions,	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  Interzone	  is	  dominated	  by	  the	  Divisionists	  and	  
the	  Liquifactionalists.	  The	  Divisionists	  “cut	  off	  tiny	  bits	  of	  their	  flesh	  and	  grow	  exact	  
replicas	  of	  themselves	  in	  embryo	  jelly,”	  reproducing	  in	  the	  hope	  that	  “there	  will	  be	  one	  
replica	  of	  one	  sex	  on	  the	  planet:	  that	  is	  one	  person	  in	  the	  world	  with	  millions	  of	  separate	  
bodies”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  133).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Divisionists	  operate	  within	  a	  nominal	  data	  set	  
and	  advocate	  a	  modal	  average.19	  The	  Liquifactionalists,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  favor	  “the	  
eventual	  merging	  of	  everyone	  into	  One	  Man	  by	  a	  process	  of	  protoplasmic	  absorption”	  
(Naked	  Lunch	  120).	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  Liquifactionalists	  operate	  within	  an	  ordinal	  data	  set	  
and	  advocate	  a	  median	  average.20	  	  
The	  importance	  of	  this	  analysis,	  however,	  is	  not,	  as	  originally	  suggested,	  to	  
determine	  which	  party	  or	  statistical	  tool	  most	  closely	  resembles	  Roth’s	  ‘average	  reader’,	  
but	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  “the	  parties	  are	  not	  in	  practice	  separate	  but	  blend	  in	  all	  
combinations,”	  existing	  as	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  reductive	  coin	  (Naked	  Lunch	  135).	  
The	  determination	  of	  ‘the	  average’	  is	  not	  a	  neutral	  description	  of	  demographic	  phenomena,	  
or	  an	  extension	  of	  populist	  sentiment,	  but	  a	  strategic	  endpoint	  towards	  which	  possibilities	  
of	  difference	  are	  funneled	  and	  subsumed	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  similarity.	  When	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Nominal	  data,	  used	  in	  qualitative	  analysis,	  differentiates	  objects	  based	  on	  their	  relative	  
adherence	  to	  established	  taxonomies	  of	  classification.	  Therefore,	  mode	  indicates	  what	  is	  
most	  common	  within	  any	  given	  structure.	  As	  the	  Divisionists	  divide,	  their	  modal	  tendency	  
strengthens.	  
20	  Ordinal	  data	  cannot	  be	  measured	  absolutely,	  and	  thus	  orders	  values	  in	  accordance	  to	  
their	  relative	  difference.	  The	  median	  functions	  to	  indicate	  the	  middle	  of	  a	  set.	  As	  the	  
Liquifactionalists	  converge	  their	  median	  tendency	  strengthens.	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attempting	  to	  clarify	  the	  identity	  of	  average	  reader	  of	  Naked	  Lunch21,	  Paul	  Carroll	  described	  
someone	  “who	  reads	  serious	  works	  of	  literature	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  not	  merely	  
entertainment,	  but	  of	  finding	  deeper	  insights	  into	  his	  own	  condition	  and	  the	  life	  around	  
him…	  to	  learn	  some	  of	  the	  truths	  of	  life	  from	  that	  literature,”	  providing	  a	  highly	  detailed	  
account	  of	  an	  otherwise	  general	  distinction	  (Goodman	  46).	  22	  	  While	  any	  of	  these	  
descriptions	  may	  be	  accurate	  themselves,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  veracity	  of	  the	  court’s	  claims	  that	  is	  
problematic,	  but	  rather	  their	  linguistic	  concealment.	  If	  Roth’s	  justification	  for	  overturning	  
Hicklin’s	  definition	  of	  the	  intended-­‐readers	  is	  to	  be	  accepted,	  then	  the	  court’s	  use	  of	  
metaphorical	  abstraction	  to	  obscure	  their	  own	  criteria	  stands	  as	  a	  subtle,	  yet	  powerful	  
example	  of	  the	  controlled	  reproduction	  of	  order.	  	  	  
Identifying	  this	  silent	  pull	  towards	  homogeneity	  as	  an	  inherent	  characteristic	  of	  
language	  itself,	  Burroughs	  embraces	  the	  literalness	  of	  metonymy	  as	  a	  rhetorical	  weapon	  
against	  the	  abstraction	  of	  metaphor.	  Expressed	  more	  sharply,	  metaphor	  spawns	  “Abstract	  
thought,	  bare	  as	  algebra,	  narrow	  down	  to	  a	  black	  turd	  or	  a	  pair	  of	  aging	  cajones,”	  in	  this	  
case	  belonging	  to	  Burroughs	  (Naked	  Lunch	  177).	  Demonstrated	  by	  the	  critical/legal	  
insistence	  on	  “The	  Deposition’”s	  autobiographical	  drug	  narrative	  as	  an	  over-­‐arching	  
metaphor	  for	  Naked	  Lunch	  as	  a	  whole,	  Burroughs	  scholar	  Robin	  Lydenberg	  notes	  “the	  
instinct	  of	  the	  humanist	  critic	  confronted	  with	  Burroughs’	  writing	  is	  to	  dress	  it	  up	  as	  
allegory	  and	  moral	  satire,	  to	  distance	  and	  defuse	  the	  novel	  by	  making	  it	  a	  mediating	  or	  
disposable	  code	  serving	  a	  more	  abstract	  and	  therefore	  less	  threatening	  message”	  (Word	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Specifically,	  Paul	  Carroll	  is	  referring	  to	  readership	  of	  the	  1959	  publication	  of	  large	  
excerpts	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  in	  the	  first	  issue	  of	  the	  literary	  magazine,	  Big	  Table.	  
22	  Similarly,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  use	  of	  profanity	  did	  not	  exceed	  contemporary	  
community	  standards	  due	  to	  the	  prevalence	  of	  ‘four-­‐letter’	  words	  in	  other	  literary	  works,	  	  
namely	  Ulysses.	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Cultures	  9).	  Initiating	  a	  relationship	  of	  similarity	  between	  two	  otherwise	  independently	  
signified	  objects,	  metaphor	  unifies	  literal	  difference	  under	  a	  single,	  dominant	  
interpretation.	  The	  “Deposition’”s	  metaphorical	  construction	  of	  ‘the	  addict’	  as	  a	  symbol	  of	  
the	  singular	  relationship	  between	  Burroughs	  and	  drug	  addiction	  employs	  what	  Korzybski	  
terms	  ‘the	  is	  of	  identity.’	  Attacking	  this	  phenomenon,	  Burroughs	  remarks,	  
“You	  are	  an	  animal.	  You	  are	  a	  body.	  Now	  whatever	  you	  may	  be	  you	  are	  
not	  an	  ‘animal,’	  you	  are	  not	  a	  ‘body,’	  because	  these	  are	  verbal	  labels.	  The	  IS	  of	  
identity	  always	  carries	  the	  implication	  of	  that	  and	  nothing	  else,	  and	  it	  also	  
carries	  the	  assignment	  of	  permanent	  condition.	  […]	  I	  cannot	  be	  and	  am	  not	  
the	  verbal	  label	  ‘myself.’	  The	  word	  BE	  in	  English	  contains,	  as	  a	  virus	  contains,	  
its	  pre-­‐coded	  message	  of	  damage,	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  of	  permanent	  
condition.	  To	  be	  a	  body,	  to	  be	  nothing	  else,	  to	  stay	  a	  body.	  To	  be	  an	  animal,	  to	  
be	  nothing	  else,	  to	  stay	  an	  animal.	  (The	  Job	  200).	  	  
	  
Staging	  metaphor	  as	  a	  violent	  act	  of	  naming,	  Burroughs	  turns	  to	  metonymy	  not	  as	  
an	  antidote,	  but	  as	  a	  “naked	  version	  of	  metaphor”	  which	  “allows	  him	  to	  lay	  bare	  the	  
repressive	  abuses	  of	  word	  and	  image	  which	  metaphor	  works	  to	  disguise”	  (Word	  Cultures	  
30).	  Lydenberg	  points	  to	  the	  parable	  of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  “Talking	  Asshole”	  as	  evidence	  of	  
Burroughs’	  metonymic	  unveiling.	  Depicting	  a	  ventriloquist	  act	  in	  which	  a	  carnival	  worker	  
teaches	  his	  asshole	  to	  talk,	  the	  passage	  demonstrates	  how	  “the	  metaphorical	  ‘man	  is	  an	  ass’	  
becomes	  the	  metonymic	  ‘man	  is	  an	  asshole.’	  Man	  is	  not	  tentatively	  ‘like’	  an	  ass,	  but	  
unavoidably	  attached	  to	  his	  own	  anus”	  (Word	  Cultures	  38).	  	  This	  knowledge	  deconstructs	  
the	  mind/body	  dualism	  that	  constitutes	  selfhood.	  No	  longer	  required	  for	  reproduction	  of	  
the	  linguistic	  self,	  the	  mouth	  becomes	  unnecessary	  and	  is	  ultimately	  absorbed	  back	  into	  the	  
body	  repurposed	  to	  more	  valuable	  ends	  Denied	  a	  voice,	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  carnival	  
worker’s	  mouth	  parallels	  the	  legal/critical	  marginalization	  of	  alternative	  interpretations	  of	  
Naked	  Lunch.	  As	  the	  asshole	  says	  to	  the	  mouth,	  “It’s	  you	  who	  will	  shut	  up	  in	  the	  end.	  Not	  
me.	  Because	  we	  don’t	  need	  you	  around	  here	  any	  more.	  I	  can	  talk	  and	  eat	  and	  shit”	  (Naked	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Lunch	  110).	  Like	  the	  asshole,	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  autobiographical	  drug	  narrative	  dominates	  
the	  body	  of	  the	  text	  by	  eliminating	  the	  need	  for	  alternative	  interpretations.	  The	  drug	  
narrative’s	  ability	  to	  conveniently	  encompass	  and	  explain	  the	  entirety	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  with	  
a	  single	  metaphor	  makes	  additional	  interpretations	  superfluous.	  Concealed	  behind	  the	  
legal	  signifiers	  ‘social	  importance’	  and	  ‘literary	  value,’	  Roth’s	  criteria	  covertly	  “equates	  
interpretation	  with	  metaphorical	  decoding	  and	  with	  the	  ethical	  pursuit	  of	  truth”	  (Word	  
Cultures	  10).	  In	  doing	  so,	  Roth	  creates	  a	  legal	  metaphor	  that	  mandates	  metaphorical	  
reading,	  marginalizing	  divergent	  approaches	  as	  unserious,	  unethical,	  and	  ultimately	  
obscene.	  Through	  a	  program	  of	  radical	  self-­‐contradiction	  Burroughs	  challenges	  the	  binary	  
structures	  that	  support	  the	  dominance	  of	  Roth’s	  legal	  metaphors:	  interpretation	  IS	  
metaphorical,	  literature	  IS	  interpretable,	  and	  obscenity	  IS	  not	  literature.	  If	  interpretation	  is	  
understood	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  assignment	  of	  identity	  to	  a	  text,	  or	  the	  naming	  of	  a	  text,	  the	  
refusal	  of	  a	  static	  identity	  precludes	  a	  text’s	  capacity	  for	  unified	  interpretation.	  	  	  
	  
“Immaculate	  Birth	  Control”	  
	   Intended	  to	  isolate	  an	  individual-­‐part	  so	  that	  it	  might	  stand	  in	  for	  the	  whole	  of	  a	  
subject’s	  identity,	  metaphor,	  like	  the	  panopticon,	  depends	  the	  rigid	  delineation	  of	  
boundaries	  to	  maintain	  proper	  functioning.	  Kept	  separate	  from	  one	  another,	  individuals	  
existing	  within	  a	  disciplinary	  apparatus	  are	  “confined	  to	  a	  cell	  from	  which	  [they	  are]	  seen	  
from	  the	  front	  by	  a	  supervisor;	  but	  the	  side	  walls	  protect	  [them]	  from	  coming	  into	  contact	  
with	  [their]	  companions”	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  200).	  Arranged	  hierarchically,	  the	  
conceptual	  organization	  of	  metaphorical	  decoding	  resembles	  the	  vertical	  configuration	  of	  
the	  Panopticon’s	  cellular	  structure.	  Obstructing	  the	  horizontal	  view	  of	  its	  inmates,	  the	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Panopticon’s	  sturdy	  walls	  “imply	  a	  lateral	  invisibility.	  And	  this	  invisibility	  is	  a	  guarantee	  of	  
order”	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  201).	  Relying	  exclusively	  on	  this	  lack	  of	  visibility	  to	  maintain	  
order,	  “[Jeremy]	  Bentham	  was	  surprised	  that	  panoptic	  institutions	  could	  be	  so	  light:	  there	  
were	  no	  more	  bars,	  no	  more	  chains,	  no	  more	  heavy	  locks;	  all	  that	  was	  needed	  was	  that	  the	  
separations	  should	  be	  clear	  and	  the	  openings	  well	  arranged”	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  202).	  
Rejecting	  the	  verticality	  of	  metaphor	  for	  the	  more	  horizontal	  nature	  of	  metonymy,	  Naked	  
Lunch	  orchestrates	  a	  daring	  prison	  break	  by	  leveling	  the	  walls	  temporal/special	  cohesion	  
that	  have	  traditionally	  constrained	  literary	  production.	  Instead	  instituting	  a	  rhizomatic	  
structure	  of	  mosaic	  juxtapositions,	  Naked	  Lunch	  throws	  a	  wrench	  into	  the	  Panopticon’s	  
“marvelous	  machine	  which,	  whatever	  use	  one	  may	  wish	  to	  put	  it	  to,	  produces	  the	  
homogeneous	  effects	  of	  power”	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  201).	  	  Terminating	  the	  reproduction	  
of	  vertical	  order,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  fictive	  landscape	  gives	  birth	  to	  the	  monstrous	  potential	  for	  
new,	  heterogeneous	  forms	  of	  life	  and	  literature.	  	  
	   A	  Keystone	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  metaphorical	  walls	  of	  identity,	  binary	  logic	  is	  
dependent	  on	  institutional	  discipline	  to	  inscribe	  and	  reinforce	  its	  constitutional	  
boundaries.	  As	  such,	  the	  clinical	  marginalization	  of	  addiction	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  psychopathy	  
reinforces	  the	  shape	  of	  sanity	  by	  separating	  similarity	  from	  difference,	  and	  by	  protecting	  
the	  coherence	  of	  the	  self	  from	  the	  disorder	  of	  the	  other.	  However,	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  
insistence	  on	  the	  firm	  delineation	  of	  the	  exterior	  from	  the	  interior	  that	  the	  figure	  of	  ‘the	  
addict’	  frustrates.	  The	  ability	  of	  a	  hypodermic	  syringe	  to	  puncture	  the	  skin,	  breaching	  the	  
internal/external	  bodily	  barrier,	  and	  to	  convert	  the	  material	  substance	  of	  heroin	  into	  the	  
immaterial	  sensation	  of	  a	  fix	  destabilizes	  the	  reassuring	  dichotomies	  of	  mind/body,	  
self/other.	  Without	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  discernible	  cause	  or	  origin	  to	  differentiate	  ‘the	  addict’	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from	  ‘the	  normal	  citizen’	  the	  walls	  of	  identity	  are	  proven	  more	  permeable	  than	  previously	  
thought.	  Thus,	  the	  drive	  to	  regulate	  addiction	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  reflective	  of	  larger	  anxieties	  
regarding	  the	  separation	  between	  the	  public	  and	  private	  spheres.	  	  
To	  better	  understand	  the	  relationship	  between	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  alleged	  obscenity	  and	  
the	  intersection	  of	  public	  and	  private	  life,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  once	  again	  revisit	  the	  
foundations	  of	  obscenity	  law	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  discussion,	  that	  has	  so	  
far	  been	  fraught	  with	  the	  repeated	  deference	  of	  origins,	  Molly	  McGarry’s	  historical	  analysis	  
of	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  provides	  another,	  possibly	  misleading,	  starting	  point.	  As	  the	  first	  
national	  obscenity	  statute,	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  in	  1873	  gave	  the	  federal	  
government	  the	  power	  to	  regulate	  the	  content	  of	  material	  circulated	  through	  the	  U.S	  mail,	  
while	  also	  marking	  a	  “move	  from	  circumscribing	  sexual	  acts	  to	  banning	  sexually	  explicit	  
texts	  and	  images	  as	  means	  to	  control	  behavior"	  (McGarry	  19).	  McGarry	  argues	  that	  the	  
Comstock	  Laws	  sought	  control	  over	  the	  Postal	  Service	  not	  out	  of	  political	  expediency,	  but	  
rather	  out	  of	  a	  deep	  seeded	  concern	  with	  the	  function	  of	  the	  mail	  itself.	  	  
When	  considering	  this	  concern,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  rapid	  
expansion	  of	  new	  postal	  routes	  into	  previously	  isolated	  communities,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  
expansion	  of	  literacy	  amongst	  women	  and	  children.	  Merging	  these	  disparate	  anxieties,	  
McGarry	  notes	  that,	  “Comstock	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  mail	  was	  a	  unique	  conduit	  between	  
public	  and	  private”	  (McGarry	  21).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  installation	  of	  the	  mail	  slot	  in	  the	  
American	  home	  signaled	  a	  leak	  in	  the	  hermetic	  seal	  of	  the	  private	  sphere.	  Once	  separate	  
and	  safe	  from	  chaotic	  forces	  of	  the	  outside	  world,	  the	  privacy	  of	  the	  home	  could	  now	  be	  
invaded	  by	  anyone	  for	  the	  price	  of	  a	  stamp.	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  When	  read	  as	  a	  text,	  the	  solidly	  defined	  boundaries	  of	  the	  home	  facilitate,	  if	  not	  
require,	  the	  marginalization	  of	  alternative	  interpretations	  of	  private	  sphere.	  In	  this	  
particular	  instance,	  the	  dominant	  interpretation	  of	  the	  home	  can	  be	  understood	  to	  adhere	  
to	  a	  traditionally	  patriarchic	  rubric	  of	  value,	  in	  which	  the	  primary	  objective	  of	  the	  home	  is	  
decidedly	  reproductive.	  In	  this	  sense,	  the	  home	  and	  the	  family	  function	  as	  fundamental	  
building	  blocks	  in	  the	  reproduction	  of	  the	  larger	  normative	  order	  of	  society.	  In	  his	  
discussion	  of	  ideology,	  Marxist	  philosopher,	  Louis	  Althusser,	  argues	  that,	  ‘in	  order	  to	  exist,	  
every	  social	  formation	  must	  reproduce	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  production	  at	  the	  same	  time	  as	  
it	  produces,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  produce.	  It	  must	  therefore	  reproduce:	  1.	  The	  
productive	  forces	  [and]	  2.	  The	  existing	  relations	  of	  production”	  (Althusser	  2).	  	  As	  such,	  to	  
continue	  creating	  these	  building	  blocks,	  the	  home	  must	  also	  reproduce	  in	  a	  physical	  sense.	  
It	  is	  no	  wonder	  then,	  that	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  “expanded	  the	  category	  of	  obscenity	  to	  
encompass	  all	  printed	  material,	  and,	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history,	  criminalized	  the	  
circulation	  of	  information	  and	  advertisements	  about	  contraception	  and	  abortion”	  (McGarry	  
9).	  As	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  strictly	  reproductive	  mode	  of	  sex	  that	  allowed	  the	  home	  to	  
replicate	  itself,	  information	  on	  contraception	  and	  abortion	  posed	  a	  threat	  to	  continuation	  of	  
normative	  order.	  Similarly,	  any	  printed	  material	  that	  aroused	  desire	  outside	  the	  realm	  of	  
reproductive	  sexuality	  could	  not	  be	  assimilated	  into	  the	  dominant	  interpretation	  of	  ‘the	  
home’	  and,	  as	  such,	  was	  expelled	  from	  the	  private	  sphere	  and	  deemed	  obscene.23	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Aware	  of	  the	  mail’s	  role	  in	  the	  reformation	  the	  public/private	  borders	  that	  constituted	  
shape	  of	  ‘the	  home,’	  and	  society	  at	  large,	  Comstock	  understood	  that	  “the	  mail	  was	  at	  once	  a	  
national	  entity	  and	  a	  system	  allowing	  for	  the	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  information	  across	  
state	  lines,”	  and	  that,	  as	  such,	  “it	  represented	  an	  ideal	  target	  for	  reformers	  interested	  in	  
constructing	  a	  unified	  national	  culture	  in	  the	  decade	  following	  the	  Civil	  War”	  (McGarry	  21).	  
Through	  the	  control	  of	  what	  was	  not	  acceptable,	  social	  reformers,	  like	  Comstock,	  subtly	  
shaped	  what	  was	  acceptable,	  only	  to	  use	  the	  standard	  they	  had	  set	  to	  justify	  their	  initial	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Despite	  the	  accusations	  made	  by	  prosecutors	  regarding	  the	  prurience	  of	  Naked	  
Lunch,	  a	  brief	  comparison	  of	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  to	  the	  Roth	  Test	  suggests	  not	  that	  Naked	  
Lunch	  was	  overly	  concerned	  with	  sex,	  but	  rather,	  that	  is	  was	  concerned	  with	  the	  wrong	  
type	  of	  sex.	  The	  Roth	  judgment	  states:	  
“4.	  (c)	  The	  standard	  for	  judging	  obscenity,	  adequate	  to	  withstand	  the	  charge	  
of	  constitutional	  infirmity,	  is	  whether,	  to	  the	  average	  person,	  applying	  
contemporary	  community	  standards,	  the	  dominant	  theme	  of	  the	  material,	  
taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  appeals	  to	  prurient	  interest.	  “	  
	  
The	  establishment	  of	  prurient	  interest	  as	  a	  primary	  marker	  of	  obscenity	  initially	  
appears	  to	  contradict	  the	  reproductive	  drive	  that	  I	  have	  argued	  shaped	  the	  Comstock	  Laws.	  
However,	  loosely	  defined	  as	  an	  excessive	  interest	  in	  sex,	  the	  prurient	  appeal	  of	  the	  Roth	  
Test	  does	  not	  refer	  to	  excess	  as	  an	  overabundance,	  but	  rather	  to	  excess	  as	  exceedance.	  
Canguilheim’s	  cryptic	  aphorism,	  “One	  could	  say	  that	  a	  rock	  is	  enormous,	  but	  not	  that	  a	  
mountain	  is	  monstrous,”	  provides	  a	  useful	  model	  for	  understanding	  this	  ambiguous	  
rhetoric’s	  relationship	  to	  obscenity	  (Canguilheim	  135).	  To	  do	  so,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  
argue	  that	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  were	  not	  directly	  concerned	  with	  sexual	  desire,	  but	  rather	  
with	  its	  application,	  for	  without	  an	  abundance	  of	  sexual	  drive	  the	  reproductive	  duties	  of	  the	  
home	  could	  not	  be	  fulfilled	  and	  order	  could	  not	  be	  sustained.	  In	  differentiating	  the	  
enormous	  from	  the	  monstrous	  Canguilheim	  explains,	  “The	  enormous	  escapes	  a	  norm	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
determination	  of	  obscenity.	  Returning	  to	  the	  figure	  of	  ‘the	  addict’,	  challenges	  to	  the	  
established	  boundaries	  of	  order	  generate	  anxiety	  because	  they	  loosen	  the	  bolts	  that	  anchor	  
personal	  identity,	  however	  these	  moments	  of	  destabilization	  are	  also	  ripe	  for	  control.	  
When	  boundaries	  become	  blurry	  they	  can	  easily	  be	  reshaped	  to	  reinforce	  and	  reproduce	  
normative	  orders.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  Boston	  trial	  did	  to	  Naked	  Lunch,	  the	  medical	  
establishment	  did	  to	  the	  addict,	  and	  Comstock	  did	  to	  the	  mail.	  These	  systems,	  dependent	  on	  
the	  substitution	  of	  difference	  for	  similarity,	  pick	  up	  momentum	  as	  they	  are	  reproduced.	  As	  
more	  and	  more	  difference	  is	  assimilated	  into	  rubrics	  of	  similarity	  the	  evidence	  of	  the	  
naturalness	  or	  truth	  of	  those	  rubrics	  is	  corroborated	  in	  an	  exponential	  feedback	  loop.	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is	  only	  metric,”	  while	  “the	  existence	  of	  monsters	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  capacity	  of	  life	  to	  
tech	  us	  order”	  (Canguilheim	  134-­‐135).	  Accordingly,	  Roth’s	  obscenity	  standard	  does	  not	  
indicate	  the	  measure	  of	  a	  work’s	  ‘prurient	  appeal,’	  but	  rather	  if	  the	  ‘prurient	  appeal’	  of	  a	  
work	  can	  be	  measured.	  Measurable	  in	  its	  consistency,	  the	  reproductive	  drive	  privileged	  by	  
the	  Comstock	  Laws	  may	  be	  prurient,	  but	  is	  not	  obscene.	  However,	  without	  the	  consistency	  
of	  order,	  measurement	  is	  impossible,	  and	  if	  a	  work	  cannot	  be	  measured	  it	  is	  monstrous,	  or	  
rather	  it	  is	  obscene.	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  consistency	  and	  obscenity	  are	  in	  conflict.	  The	  reproductive	  drive	  that	  
informs	  the	  Comstock	  Laws	  is	  an	  imperative	  towards	  similarity;	  towards	  the	  replication	  of	  
the	  home	  unit	  and	  the	  vertical	  hierarchy	  that	  it	  supports.	  Therefore,	  material	  that	  resists	  
reproduction	  also	  resists	  similarity,	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  is	  obscene.	  Until	  this	  point,	  the	  term	  
“reproduction”	  has	  been	  used	  almost	  exclusively	  in	  reference	  to	  biological	  replication.	  This	  
usage	  is	  limited,	  however.	  Linking	  sexual	  reproduction	  to	  textual	  reproduction,	  Barthes	  
offers	  a	  useful	  analogy	  that	  may	  refine	  the	  term’s	  relationship	  to	  the	  larger	  argument.	  
Drawing	  a	  rhetorical	  connection	  between	  sexual	  reproduction	  and	  the	  readerly	  text,	  
Barthes	  states:	  
“The	  alibi	  of	  organic	  reproduction	  which	  supports	  the	  ‘readerly’	  work	  
culminates	  in	  the	  image	  of	  the	  text	  as	  a	  pregnant	  female	  body	  waiting	  to	  be	  
‘delivered’;	  “	  [Any]	  classic	  (readerly)	  text	  is	  implicitly	  an	  art	  of	  Replete	  
Literature:	  literature	  that	  is	  replete:	  like	  a	  cupboard	  where	  meanings	  are	  
shelved,	  stacked,	  safeguarded	  (in	  this	  text	  nothing	  is	  ever	  lost:	  meaning	  
recuperates	  everything);	  like	  a	  pregnant	  female,	  replete	  with	  signifieds	  
which	  criticism	  will	  not	  fail	  to	  deliver”	  (S/Z	  200-­‐201).	  	  
	  
While	  Barthes	  uses	  biology	  to	  figuratively	  indicate	  how	  the	  recuperation	  of	  meaning	  
from	  a	  readerly	  text	  is	  dependent	  on	  its	  consistency,	  Burroughs	  offers	  a	  more	  literal	  
account.	  Attacking	  physical	  reproduction	  through	  textual	  means,	  Burroughs	  issues	  a	  “bull	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on	  immaculate	  birth	  control,”	  and	  rejects	  the	  ordered	  similarity	  of	  the	  readerly	  text	  and	  the	  
home	  (Naked	  Lunch	  178).	  Noted	  Burroughs	  scholar,	  Robin	  Lydenberg,	  reads	  Burroughs’	  
stance	  as	  one	  in	  which	  procreation	  “moves	  towards	  a	  sterile	  repetition	  which	  increasingly	  
resists	  evolution	  and	  change”	  (Word	  Cultures	  156).	  This	  aversion	  to	  reproduction	  is	  often	  
foregrounded	  by	  other	  critics	  who	  have	  accused	  Burroughs	  of	  being	  anti-­‐humanist,	  or	  more	  
broadly,	  in	  opposition	  to	  life	  itself,	  a	  sentiment	  that	  was	  carried	  into	  the	  courtroom	  as	  
further	  evidence	  of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  obscenity.	  Individual	  passages,	  such	  as	  the	  following	  
section	  from	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  “Benway”	  chapter,	  often	  appear	  to	  corroborate	  these	  
interpretations.	  	  
“Male	  and	  female	  castrated	  he	  them.	  Who	  can’t	  distinguish	  between	  the	  
sexes?	  I’ll	  cut	  your	  throat	  you	  white	  motherfucker.	  Come	  out	  in	  the	  open	  like	  
my	  grandchild	  and	  meet	  thy	  unborn	  mother	  in	  dubious	  battle.	  Confusion	  
hath	  fuck	  his	  masterpiece.	  I	  have	  cut	  the	  janitor’s	  throat	  quite	  by	  mistake	  of	  
identity,	  he	  being	  such	  a	  horrible	  fuck	  like	  the	  old	  man.	  And	  in	  the	  coal	  bin	  all	  
cocks	  are	  alike.”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  45)	  
	  
While	  the	  passage’s	  fixation	  on	  genital	  mutilation	  suggests	  an	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  
reproduction	  of	  new	  life,	  rather,	  it	  is	  the	  repetition	  of	  this	  production	  that	  Burroughs	  
attacks.	  Lydenberg	  argues	  “the	  only	  way	  out	  of	  the	  repressive	  channeling	  of	  conventional	  
modes	  of	  reproduction	  is	  to	  break	  open	  the	  seamless	  enclosure	  of	  the	  work’s	  logocentric	  
body,	  to	  liberate	  it	  by	  castration24	  or	  dismemberment,”	  a	  task	  that	  Burroughs	  accomplishes	  
through	  the	  sexual	  and	  syntactical	  disfigurement	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  (Word	  Cultures	  163).	  
Rather	  than	  eliminating	  markers	  of	  sexual	  difference,	  the	  dual	  castration	  Burroughs	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  “There	  are,	  as	  Barbra	  Johnson	  has	  pointed	  out,	  two	  modes	  of	  castration	  for	  Barthes:	  the	  
negative	  mode	  which	  reduces	  plurality	  to	  structures	  of	  binary	  opposition	  and	  univocal	  
readings,	  cutting	  the	  multiple	  braid	  of	  the	  text’s	  meanings;	  and	  a	  positive	  mode	  which	  
functions	  as	  a	  cutting	  free,	  a	  cutting	  loose	  from	  all	  restrictive	  structures”	  (Word	  Cultures	  
163).	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performs	  on	  ‘Male	  and	  Female’	  functions	  to	  sever	  signifier	  from	  signified,	  and	  human	  
sexuality	  from	  its	  morphological	  constraints.	  The	  inversion	  of	  traditional	  ‘subject-­‐verb-­‐
object’	  sentence	  structure	  in	  the	  passages	  opening	  line	  frustrates	  the	  reproduction	  of	  
unified	  meaning	  through	  the	  destabilization	  of	  the	  syntactic	  identity.	  Without	  the	  
interpretive	  boundaries	  of	  normative	  grammar	  to	  corral	  the	  sentence’s	  signifiers	  into	  a	  
familiar	  pattern	  it	  becomes	  unclear	  who	  or	  what	  is	  castrated.	  In	  the	  same	  sense,	  the	  textual	  
amputation	  of	  genitalia	  uncouples	  the	  linguistic	  designations	  ‘Male	  and	  Female’	  from	  their	  
biological	  hosts,	  begging	  the	  question,	  “Who	  can’t	  distinguish	  between	  the	  sexes?”	  
Administering	  a	  positive	  mode	  of	  castration,	  Burroughs	  severs	  sexuality	  from	  its	  
reproductive	  anchor,	  “dismantling	  modes	  of	  reproduction,	  both	  sexual	  and	  textual”	  (Word	  
Cultures	  156).	  Demanding	  that	  repressive	  sexual	  dualism	  “Come	  out	  in	  the	  open	  like	  my	  
grandchild	  and	  meet	  thy	  unborn	  mother	  in	  dubious	  battle,”	  Burroughs	  challenges	  the	  
notion	  of	  genealogical	  causation	  that	  structures	  the	  very	  concept	  of	  reproduction.	  Freed	  
from	  the	  deterministic	  confines	  of	  seamless	  linear	  progression,	  the	  reproductive	  order	  of	  
operations	  breaks	  down,	  and	  “open[s]	  the	  way	  for	  new	  and	  monstrous	  births,	  for	  
unthinkable	  transformations”	  (Word	  Cultures	  156).	  In	  this	  sense,	  Burroughs	  is	  not	  opposed	  
to	  life,	  only	  its	  controlled	  stagnation.	  In	  another	  sense,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  sexual	  drive	  is	  
productive,	  as	  opposed	  to	  (re)productive.	  	  
The	  discursive	  technology	  of	  the	  obscenity	  trial	  functions	  to	  erect	  a	  panopticon	  of	  
literary/legal	  judgment	  that,	  through	  the	  isolation	  of	  individual	  textual	  interpretations	  and	  
authorial	  identities,	  controls	  whatever	  text	  might	  fall	  under	  its	  gaze.	  In	  turn,	  the	  gaze	  of	  the	  
obscenity	  trial	  creates	  docile	  textual	  bodies	  that	  function	  to	  reproduce	  established	  
aesthetic	  and	  ontological	  norms.	  In	  response,	  Naked	  Lunch	  fractures	  the	  panoptical	  lens	  of	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literary	  discipline	  by	  breaking	  down	  the	  temporal/spatial	  walls	  of	  coherent,	  linear	  
narrative	  that	  would	  otherwise	  isolate	  the	  many	  voices	  of	  the	  text.	  In	  doing	  so,	  Burroughs	  
denies	  the	  critical	  addiction	  to	  metaphorical	  decoding	  which	  serves	  to	  objectify	  texts	  as	  
something	  to	  discovered	  and	  consumed.	  Relying	  on	  a	  relentless	  dedication	  to	  metonymic	  
literalism,	  Naked	  Lunch	  reflects	  the	  Court’s	  panoptic	  gaze,	  shining	  a	  light	  back	  at	  the	  
structures	  of	  control	  that	  have	  shaped	  its	  critical	  reception.	  By	  placing	  the	  burden	  of	  
visibility	  back	  on	  the	  legal	  system	  that	  banned	  it,	  Naked	  Lunch	  was	  eventually	  exonerated	  
on	  appeal	  when	  the	  Massachusetts	  State	  Supreme	  Court	  reversed	  its	  initial	  obscenity	  
ruling.	  Recalling	  the	  case,	  the	  prosecutor,	  Assistant	  Attorney	  General	  William	  Cowin,	  
remarked,	  “As	  far	  as	  the	  merits	  were	  concerned	  I	  think	  the	  decision	  was	  correct	  then	  and	  is	  
correct	  now.	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  very	  much	  is	  left	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment	  if	  its	  strength	  is	  so	  
reduced	  that	  it	  does	  not	  protect	  a	  book	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  from	  proscription.”	  
(Goodman	  246).	  25	  	  While	  Cowin’s	  change	  of	  heart	  appears	  admirable,	  it	  is	  strange,	  
nonetheless,	  that	  a	  book	  that	  he	  once	  persuasively	  argued	  lacked	  any	  redeeming	  social	  
value	  could,	  less	  than	  a	  decade	  later,	  be	  valuable	  enough	  to	  him	  to	  affirm	  his	  confidence	  in	  
the	  strength	  of	  the	  First	  Amendment…That	  is,	  unless	  it	  was	  not	  Cowin’s	  opinion	  that	  
changed,	  but	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  textual	  identity,	  instead.	  	  
	  
“If	  you	  can’t	  be	  just	  be	  arbitrary”	  
Tracing	  the	  genealogy	  of	  obscenity	  from	  its	  earliest	  statutory	  manifestations	  in	  17th	  
century	  England	  outwards	  towards	  Miller	  v.	  California,	  a	  case	  many	  First	  Amendment	  
scholars	  consider	  to	  signal	  the	  death	  of	  literary	  obscenity,	  there	  arises	  a	  discernable	  trend.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  Interview	  with	  Michael	  Goodman	  on	  26	  April	  1976.	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Due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  progressive	  abstraction	  of	  obscenity	  criteria,	  the	  liberalization	  of	  
national	  obscenity	  laws,	  championed	  by	  advocates	  of	  artistic	  freedom,	  has	  instead	  
functioned	  to	  substitute	  a	  disciplinary	  model	  of	  censorship	  for	  a	  more	  insidious	  model	  
based	  on	  control.	  While	  literature	  ceases	  to	  face	  any	  substantive	  obscenity	  regulation	  on	  
the	  national	  and	  state	  level,	  Litowitz	  reminds,	  “Where	  the	  law	  is	  silent,	  the	  individual	  is	  not	  
necessarily	  free.	  […]	  New	  regulations	  are	  not	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  clearly	  coercive	  
premodern	  laws,	  but	  they	  are	  nonetheless	  coercive	  in	  a	  more	  subtle	  way”	  (Litowitz	  80).	  
Under	  this	  control	  the	  unblinking	  gaze	  of	  the	  panopticon	  is	  replaced	  by	  an	  inward	  gaze	  that	  
is	  no	  longer	  dependent	  on	  the	  long	  dead	  obscenity	  court	  to	  impose	  boundaries	  and	  limits	  
on	  literary	  production.	  An	  example	  of	  what	  Foucault	  terms	  a	  Negative	  Utopia,	  the	  
humanitarian	  impulse	  to	  protect	  literature	  from	  censorship	  ultimately	  internalized	  the	  
literary	  censor.	  Transitioning	  from	  the	  outright	  suppression	  of	  Comstock’s	  literary	  dungeon	  
to	  the	  restrained	  discipline	  of	  Roth’s	  panopticon,	  the	  forward	  momentum	  of	  obscenity’s	  
genealogical	  progress	  eventually	  served	  “to	  induce	  in	  the	  inmate	  [artist,	  critic,	  reader]	  a	  
state	  of	  conscious	  and	  permanent	  visibility	  that	  assures	  the	  automatic	  functioning	  of	  
power.	  So	  to	  arrange	  things	  that	  the	  surveillance	  is	  permanent	  in	  its	  effects,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  
discontinuous	  in	  its	  action;	  that	  the	  perfection	  of	  power	  should	  tend	  to	  render	  its	  actual	  
exercise	  unnecessary”	  (Discipline	  and	  Punish	  201).	  As	  such,	  the	  birth	  of	  literary	  control	  
must	  be	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  the	  death	  of	  literary	  obscenity.	  
A	  particularly	  ironic	  manifestation	  of	  contemporary	  literary	  control,	  the	  recent	  
disavowal	  of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  once	  dominant	  autobiographical-­‐drug-­‐narrative	  has	  been	  
replaced	  by	  a	  newly	  dominant	  interpretation;	  the	  complete	  lack	  of	  interpretability.	  In	  
response	  to	  the	  poststructural	  rejection	  of	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  drug	  narrative	  by	  Burroughs	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scholars,	  Lydenberg	  writes,	  “Even	  those	  critics	  who	  reject	  moral	  criteria	  as	  inappropriate	  
for	  an	  understanding	  of	  Burroughs’	  work	  tend	  to	  set	  up	  alternative	  hierarchies	  […]	  These	  
alternative	  goals	  are	  inevitably	  set	  in	  rigid	  binary	  opposition	  to	  moral	  aims”	  (Word	  Cultures	  
5).	  To	  assert	  that	  Naked	  Lunch	  completely	  lacks	  any	  means	  of	  interpretation	  is	  to	  perform	  a	  
critical	  half-­‐measure	  by	  simply	  substituting	  a	  presence	  for	  an	  absence.	  Analogous	  to	  
transferring	  between	  Interzone’s	  Divisionists	  and	  Liquifactionalists,	  the	  contemporary	  
critical	  denial	  of	  the	  drug	  narrative	  forms	  an	  equally	  dominant	  and	  constricting	  counter-­‐
interpretation.	  There	  exists,	  however,	  a	  middle	  ground	  of	  sorts,	  where	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  
drug	  narrative	  is	  neither	  true	  nor	  false,	  but	  somehow	  both.	  Barthes	  lends	  the	  term	  “drift”	  to	  
help	  describe	  this	  practice	  of	  holding	  multiple	  contradictory	  readings	  of	  a	  text	  
simultaneously.	  Barthes	  explains,	  “Drifting	  occurs	  whenever	  I	  do	  not	  respect	  the	  whole,	  
and	  whenever,	  by	  dint	  of	  seeming	  driven	  about	  by	  language’s	  illusions,	  seductions,	  and	  
intimidations,	  like	  a	  cork	  on	  the	  waves,	  I	  remain	  motionless,	  pivoting	  on	  the	  intractable	  
bliss	  that	  binds	  me	  to	  the	  text	  (to	  the	  world)”	  (Pleasure	  of	  the	  Text	  18-­‐19).	  On	  these	  
grounds,	  the	  drug	  narrative	  holds	  a	  certain	  emergent	  potential.	  Recognizing	  that	  the	  
signposts	  on	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  interpretive	  map	  yield	  only	  the	  most	  arbitrary	  of	  directions,	  
the	  reader	  is	  free	  to	  follow	  any	  of	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  meandering	  and	  often	  dead-­‐end	  passages,	  
making	  and	  re-­‐making	  the	  terrain	  as	  they	  proceed.	  
As	  such,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  mutate	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  sober	  awakening	  into	  a	  powerful	  
rhetorical	  device	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  expand,	  rather	  than	  confine	  the	  text.	  In	  contrasting	  
the	  introduction	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  to	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  text,	  the	  narrative	  body	  can	  be	  
characterized	  by	  the	  prevalence	  of	  its	  dream	  and	  intoxication	  symbology.	  Having	  already	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framed	  the	  act	  of	  interpretation	  as	  an	  exercise	  in	  legal/literary	  judgment,	  Deleuze’s	  
commentary	  on	  the	  matter	  becomes	  particularly	  apt:	  	  
“The	  world	  of	  judgment	  establishes	  itself	  as	  in	  a	  dream…	  In	  the	  dream	  
judgments	  are	  hurled	  into	  the	  void	  without	  encountering	  the	  resistance	  of	  a	  
milieu	  that	  would	  subject	  them	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  knowledge	  or	  experience;	  
this	  is	  why	  the	  question	  of	  judgment	  is	  first	  of	  all	  knowing	  whether	  one	  is	  
dreaming	  or	  not.	  Moreover,	  Apollo	  is	  both	  the	  god	  of	  judgment	  and	  the	  god	  of	  
dreams:	  it	  is	  Apollo	  who	  judges,	  who	  imposes	  limits	  and	  imprisons	  us	  in	  an	  
organic	  forms,	  it	  is	  the	  dream	  the	  imprisons	  life	  within	  these	  forms	  in	  whose	  
name	  life	  is	  judged…But	  once	  we	  leave	  the	  shores	  of	  judgment,	  we	  also	  
repudiate	  the	  dream	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  ‘intoxication,’	  like	  a	  high	  tide	  sweeping	  
over	  us.	  What	  we	  seek	  in	  states	  of	  intoxication-­‐drinks,	  drugs,	  ecstasies-­‐	  is	  an	  
antidote	  to	  both	  the	  dream	  and	  judgment.	  Whenever	  we	  turn	  from	  judgment	  
towards	  justice,	  we	  enter	  into	  a	  dreamless	  sleep.”	  (“To	  Have	  Done	  With	  
Judgment”	  130).	  
	  
Awake	  and	  asleep,	  Deleuze’s	  insomniac	  destabilizes	  the	  binary	  metaphor	  that	  
grounds	  the	  “Deposition’”s	  claims	  to	  authoritative	  judgment	  and	  interpretive	  singularity.26	  
Drifting	  between	  “the	  shores	  of	  judgment,”	  Deleuze’s	  insomniac,	  when	  met	  with	  the	  
question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  Burroughs	  was	  dreaming	  while	  writing	  Naked	  Lunch,	  is	  free	  to	  
reply,	  “Gentlemen,	  I	  will	  slop	  a	  pearl”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  78).	  If	  this	  answer	  seems	  like	  nonsense,	  
it	  is.	  
In	  her	  book	  Nonsense,	  literary	  theorist,	  Susan	  Stewart,	  describes	  the	  titular	  term	  as,	  
among	  other	  things,	  a	  limiting	  task.	  Outlining	  the	  parameters	  of	  a	  limiting	  task,	  Stewart	  
references	  a	  study	  performed	  by	  noted	  sociologist	  Richard	  Hilbert,	  in	  which	  members	  of	  an	  
undergraduate	  class	  were	  given	  “five	  versions	  of	  an	  event	  and	  a	  set	  of	  instructions	  to	  find	  
out	  ‘what	  really	  happened”	  (Stewart	  6).27	  Incapable	  of	  being	  unified	  under	  a	  single	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  “I	  awoke	  from	  The	  Sickness	  at	  the	  age	  of	  fort-­‐five,	  calm	  and	  sane,	  and	  in	  reasonably	  good	  
health	  except	  for	  a	  weakened	  liver	  and	  the	  look	  of	  borrowed	  flesh	  common	  to	  all	  who	  
survive	  The	  Sickness”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  7).	  	  
27	  Hilbert	  distinguishes	  “cases	  of	  sense-­‐making	  in	  which	  members	  are	  able	  to	  resolve	  
difficulties	  an	  contradictions	  and	  thus	  to	  document	  the	  objective	  and	  non-­‐contradictory	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chronology	  or	  interpretation,	  Hilbert’s	  narrative	  fragments	  resemble	  the	  material	  
components	  of	  Naked	  Lunch.28	  Mirroring	  the	  court’s	  dismissal	  of	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  text	  of	  
Naked	  Lunch	  as	  drug-­‐induced	  gibberish,	  Hilbert’s	  students	  declared	  the	  assignment	  to	  be	  
nonsense.	  Met	  with	  a	  limiting	  event,	  the	  students,	  unable	  to	  assimilate	  Hilbert’s	  fragments	  
into	  their	  pre-­‐existing	  interpretive	  order,	  classify	  the	  assignment	  as	  nonsense,	  
marginalizing	  its	  alternative	  order	  outside	  the	  bounds	  of	  interpretation	  and	  common	  sense.	  
Equally	  adrift,	  Deleuze’s	  insomniac	  turns	  away	  from	  the	  judgment	  of	  interpretation	  
towards	  the	  intoxication	  of	  justice.	  Placing	  justice	  in	  opposition	  to	  judgment,	  Deleuze	  
argues,	  “Judgment	  prevents	  the	  emergence	  of	  any	  new	  mode	  of	  existence”	  (Deleuze	  135).	  
In	  this	  sense,	  justice,	  like	  Hilbert’s	  fragments,	  represents	  a	  move	  away	  from	  the	  possibility	  
of	  order	  towards	  the	  impossibility	  of	  nonsense.	  
Derrida	  advances	  a	  similar	  notion	  in	  The	  Force	  of	  Law	  when	  he	  claims	  that	  justice	  
represents	  a	  deferred	  horizon	  towards	  which	  law	  strives	  but	  never	  reaches.	  Addressing	  an	  
audience	  at	  Cordozo	  Law	  School29	  at	  the	  1989	  symposium,	  “Deconstruction	  and	  the	  
Possibility	  of	  Justice,”	  Derrida	  claimed,	  “Justice	  is	  an	  experience	  of	  the	  impossible.	  A	  will,	  a	  
desire,	  a	  demand	  for	  justice	  whose	  structure	  wouldn’t	  be	  an	  experience	  of	  aporia	  would	  
have	  no	  chance	  to	  be	  what	  it	  is	  namely,	  a	  call	  for	  justice”	  (Litowitz	  92-­‐93).	  Reminiscent	  of	  
Hilbert’s	  definition	  of	  a	  limiting	  task,	  Derrida’s	  call	  for	  justice	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nature	  of	  Reality”	  from	  limiting	  tasks,	  which	  entail	  “the	  impossibility	  of	  resolving	  difficulty	  
and	  contradiction	  as	  an	  essential	  impossibility	  in	  that	  all	  imaginable	  methods	  of	  
reconciliation	  can	  only	  be	  imagined	  to	  fail”	  (Hilbert	  26).	  
28	  Oliver	  Harris’	  recent	  genetic	  criticism	  convincingly	  argues	  that	  Naked	  Lunch	  was	  
constructed	  from	  a	  series	  of	  letters	  sent	  by	  Burroughs	  to	  friends	  and	  colleagues.	  The	  
epistolary	  fragments	  that	  were	  stitched	  together	  to	  form	  Naked	  Lunch	  lack	  the	  essential	  
building	  blocks	  of	  traditional	  narrative,	  and	  refuse	  to	  be	  read	  as	  such.	  	  	  
29	  Coincidently,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  Boston	  defense	  attorney,	  Edward	  de	  Grazia,	  was	  a	  founding	  
member	  of	  Benjamin	  N	  Cordozo	  Law	  School.	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singularity	  of	  unified	  interpretation.	  Presenting	  his	  lecture	  entirely	  in	  English,	  Derrida	  
insists	  “To	  address	  oneself	  in	  the	  language	  of	  the	  other	  is,	  it	  seems,	  the	  condition	  of	  all	  
possible	  justice”	  (Litowitz	  92).	  As	  a	  form	  of	  judgment,	  the	  act	  of	  literary	  interpretation	  
necessitates	  the	  authoritative	  privileging	  of	  a	  single	  reading	  above,	  and	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  
other	  potential	  readings.	  In	  this	  sense,	  justice	  opposes	  interpretation.	  Derrida’s	  insistence	  
on	  the	  plurality	  of	  justice	  also	  contradicts	  the	  practice	  of	  legal	  interpretation,	  or	  law	  
making.	  Presenting	  law	  as	  “a	  system	  of	  determinate	  rules,”	  Derrida	  identifies	  “a	  process	  of	  
calculating	  between	  claims,	  a	  determination	  of	  proper	  adherence	  to	  rules,	  and	  the	  
subsuming	  of	  particular	  cases	  under	  general	  rules,”	  as	  fundamental	  to	  the	  maintenance	  and	  
reproduction	  of	  legal	  order	  (Litowitz	  93).	  Mimicking	  the	  reductive	  function	  of	  metaphor,	  
law	  subsumes	  individual	  behaviors	  under	  a	  set	  of	  restrictive	  criteria	  established	  by	  the	  
authority	  of	  historical	  consistency,	  or	  precedent.	  As	  such,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  rejection	  of	  
metaphor	  as	  a	  means	  of	  producing	  interpretive	  textual	  identity	  stands	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  
Roth’s	  obscenity	  standards	  and	  more	  broadly,	  the	  law	  as	  a	  jurisprudential	  concept.	  
Moreover,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  insistent	  metonymic	  literalness	  operates	  as	  a	  nonsensical	  call	  for	  
justice.	  	  
Loosely	  defined	  by	  a	  multiplicity	  of	  competing	  textual	  voices,	  nonsense	  eschews	  the	  
vertical	  hierarchy	  of	  interpretation,	  in	  which	  one	  voice	  dominates	  and	  silences	  the	  rest.	  
Favoring,	  instead,	  a	  horizontal	  arrangement,	  in	  which	  the	  voices	  of	  a	  text	  all	  speak	  
simultaneously	  and	  no	  one	  voice	  is	  raised	  above	  the	  others,	  nonsense	  is	  a	  manifestation	  of	  
Derridian	  justice.	  This	  cacophony	  of	  voices	  produced	  by	  justice’s	  horizontal	  structure	  
echoes	  the	  discordant	  intoxication	  sought	  by	  Deleuze’s	  insomniac	  through	  drink,	  drugs,	  
and	  ecstasy.	  A	  product	  of	  Burroughs’	  own	  self-­‐reported	  insomnia	  and	  opiate	  intoxication,	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Naked	  Lunch	  is	  often	  discredited	  as	  nonsense.	  When	  considering	  the	  fragmentary	  
presence/absence	  of	  characters,	  settings,	  and	  subplots	  in	  Naked	  Lunch,	  Lydenberg	  notes,	  
“these	  intrusions	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  hierarchical	  domination	  of	  one	  voice	  over	  another,	  
but	  a	  surgical	  attack	  on	  all	  structures	  of	  hierarchy,	  continuity,	  and	  control”	  (Word	  Cultures	  
13).	  Using	  brackets,	  italics,	  and	  other	  typographical	  incisions,	  Burroughs	  carves	  out	  literal	  
space	  from	  the	  body	  of	  the	  text	  to	  create	  room	  for	  each	  individual	  voice	  to	  resonate.	  
However,	  when	  every	  voice	  is	  allowed	  to	  speak,	  no	  single	  voice	  can	  be	  heard.	  In	  this	  sense,	  
the	  justice	  of	  nonsense	  breaks	  the	  law	  of	  interpretation.	  	  
Unlawfully	  just,	  the	  conflicted	  status	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  corroborates	  Derrida’s	  view	  of	  
“justice	  as	  something	  that	  ‘exceeds’	  the	  law	  and	  can	  perhaps	  even	  contradict	  the	  law	  in	  
extreme	  cases”	  (Litowitz	  92).	  Concerned	  with	  this	  very	  conflict,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  obscenity	  
trials	  sought	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  text	  could	  be	  contorted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  to	  
support	  metaphorical	  interpretation.	  Without	  this	  ability,	  Naked	  Lunch	  would	  have	  been	  
found	  obscene	  and	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  law.	  Instead,	  through	  a	  subtle	  program	  of	  textual	  
marginalization,	  the	  Massachusetts	  State	  Supreme	  Court	  silenced	  the	  many	  voices	  of	  Naked	  
Lunch,	  baring	  those	  of	  the	  addict	  and	  his	  drug	  polemic.	  The	  blatant	  injustice	  of	  this	  decision	  
calls	  into	  question	  the	  larger	  historical	  meta-­‐narrative	  that	  marks	  Attorney	  General	  v.	  A	  
Book	  Named	  ‘Naked	  Lunch’	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  gradual	  liberalization	  of	  obscenity	  law.	  	  
Critical	  theorists	  specializing	  in	  the	  field	  of	  ‘law	  and	  literature,’	  often	  attempt	  to	  
demonstrate	  how	  the	  law	  influences	  literary	  interpretation.	  Naked	  Lunch,	  however,	  
provides	  a	  useful	  model	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  literary	  interpretation	  influences	  the	  
law.	  While	  Derrida	  suggests	  that	  no	  legal	  judgment	  can	  meet	  the	  criteria	  of	  justice,	  Naked	  
Lunch	  offers	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  impasse,	  reminding	  “we	  see	  God	  through	  our	  assholes	  in	  the	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flash	  bulb	  of	  orgasm…Through	  these	  orifices	  transmute	  your	  body…the	  way	  OUT	  is	  the	  way	  
IN”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  180).	  Rather	  than	  advocating	  a	  futile	  attempt	  to	  avoid	  interpretation	  
outright,	  Naked	  Lunch	  pushes	  readers	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  control	  they	  exert	  over	  the	  text,	  
to	  consume	  the	  text	  with	  this	  knowledge	  in	  mind,	  to	  eat	  a	  naked	  lunch.	  Divorced	  from	  the	  
veil	  of	  metaphor,	  the	  reader	  of	  Naked	  Lunch	  is	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  interpretive	  violence	  they	  
commit	  against	  the	  text,	  forcibly	  reshaping	  Burroughs’	  fictive	  landscape	  with	  each	  reading.	  
This	  mindful	  shaping,	  however,	  is	  not	  an	  act	  of	  judgment,	  but	  an	  act	  of	  decision.	  Borrowing	  
the	  term	  from	  Deleuze,	  “A	  decision	  is	  not	  a	  judgment,	  nor	  is	  it	  the	  organic	  consequence	  of	  a	  
judgment;	  it	  springs	  vitally	  from	  a	  whirlwind	  of	  forces	  that	  leads	  us	  into	  combat.	  It	  resolves	  
the	  combat	  without	  suppressing	  or	  ending	  it”	  (“To	  Have	  Done	  With	  Judgment”	  134).	  Rather	  
than	  locking	  the	  text	  into	  static	  identity,	  decisive	  reading	  self-­‐consciously	  mutates	  the	  
textual	  body,	  continuously	  creating	  and	  destroying	  its	  meaning.	  Stating,	  “Naked	  Lunch	  is	  a	  
blueprint,	  a	  How-­‐To	  Book,”	  Burroughs	  illustrates	  the	  effect	  of	  interpretive	  decision	  by	  once	  
more	  returning	  to	  the	  literal	  (Naked	  Lunch	  176):	  
	  “The	  physical	  changes	  were	  slow	  at	  first,	  then	  jumped	  forward	  in	  black	  
klunks,	  falling	  through	  his	  slack	  tissue,	  washing	  away	  the	  human	  lines…	  In	  
his	  place	  of	  total	  darkness	  mouth	  and	  eyes	  are	  one	  organ	  that	  leaps	  forward	  
to	  snap	  with	  transparent	  teeth…	  but	  no	  organ	  is	  constant	  as	  regards	  either	  to	  
function	  or	  position…	  sex	  organs	  sprout	  anywhere…	  rectums	  open,	  defecate	  
and	  close…	  the	  entire	  organism	  changes	  color	  and	  consistency	  in	  split	  second	  
adjustments.”	  (Naked	  Lunch	  22).	  
	  
Applied	  to	  legal	  interpretation,	  Naked	  Lunch’s	  blueprint	  suggests	  the	  way	  out	  of	  the	  
conflict	  between	  law	  and	  justice	  is	  through	  excess,	  orgasm,	  or	  bliss.	  Barthes	  describes	  a	  
subject	  who	  is	  able	  to	  simultaneously	  hold	  in	  consideration	  the	  readerly	  text	  of	  law	  and	  the	  
writerly	  text	  of	  justice	  as	  “anachronic,”	  or	  nonsensical.	  The	  anachronic	  subject	  
“contradictorily	  participates	  in	  the	  profound	  hedonism	  of	  all	  culture…	  and	  in	  the	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destruction	  of	  that	  culture:	  he	  enjoys	  the	  consistency	  of	  selfhood	  and	  seeks	  its	  loss”	  
(Pleasure	  of	  the	  Text	  14).	  To	  practice	  the	  law	  as	  one	  would	  read	  Naked	  Lunch	  is	  to	  engage	  in	  
jurisprudential	  play,	  to	  perform	  the	  limiting	  task	  of	  interpretation	  without	  reciprocation,	  to	  
reject	  legal	  positivism.	  If	  Naked	  Lunch	  prompts	  its	  audience	  to	  read	  as	  a	  writer,	  perhaps	  
justice	  similarly	  requires	  legal	  professionals	  to	  practice	  the	  law	  as	  if	  the	  law	  were	  being	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